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Abstract 
Malicious logic, specifically worms cost network users an enormous amount of 
time and money.  Worms, like Slammer and Code Red, infect thousands of systems and 
denied whole networks access to the Internet.  This research examines the ability of the 
original Slammer worm, a Slammer based routing worm, and a new Single Slash Eight 
(SSE) routing worm to infect vulnerable systems within a given address space.   The 
ability of Slammer to generate a uniform random IP addresses in a given address space is 
established.  Finally, a comparison of the speed increase from a worm on a computing 
system in 2003 to those available today is performed.   
Both the Slammer based routing worm and the SSE routing worm spread faster 
than the original Slammer.  The random number generator of the original Slammer worm 
generates a statistically uniform distribution of addresses within the range under test.  
Furthermore, despite the previous research into the speed of worm propagation, there is 
still a need to test worms on the current systems.  The speed of the computing systems 
that the worms operated on in the past were more than three times slower than today’s 
systems.  As the speed of computer systems continue to grow, the speed of worm 
propagation should increase with it as their scan rates directly relate to their infection 
rate.  As such, any inherent immunity of an IPv6 network from scanning worms should 
be reexamined. 
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ANALYSIS OF ROUTING WORM INFECTION RATES ON AN IPV4 
NETWORK 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
 The dream of one world, one community has all but become a reality as a 
network of computers now connects the world both virtually and physically via the 
Internet.  Though originally implemented as a way to share information between 
universities, the Internet has grown to encompass every nation.  This has allowed for an 
amazing sharing of information and resources across the globe.  However, with this great 
good also comes the bad.  The global community’s interconnectedness and reliance on 
the Internet has led to many using the Internet for nefarious purposes.  There are people 
using the Internet to perform corporate espionage, steal identities, and in general, create 
havoc.  To that end, one of the most costly sources of this havoc for businesses and users 
alike on the Internet is malicious logic.  Of all the forms of malicious logic, computer 
worms have shown themselves to be one of the most costly for the Internet community. 
Worms can infect thousands of systems in just minutes. These fast infection rates 
reduce or eliminate the access of large corporations to the average person to Internet 
services.  Slammer, also known as Sapphire and SQL Slammer, was one of the fastest 
worms ever released onto the Internet.  As shown in Figure 1, Slammer spread 
throughout the world in just minutes.  This figure identifies the areas of the world 
infected by Slammer in less than 30 minutes [MPW03].  The blue infection circles do not 
accurately represent the number of systems infected per area, but identifies the areas 
2 
covered in order to limit the overlap with adjacent zones [MPW03].  This coverage is 
consistent with every major technological center and city across the globe and illustrates 
how interconnected the world was in 2003.  Since then, the global community has grown 
larger and even more interconnected. 
 
Figure 1. Slammer Global Infection 
Mi2g, a London based market intelligence firm, calculated that the Slammer 
worm caused “between $950 Million and $1.2 Billion in lost productivity in its first five 
days” of operation worldwide [Lem03].  Even so, Slammer was just another in a line of 
costly malicious actors–the estimated costs of Code Red, the LoveLetter virus, and the 
Klaz virus were $2.6 Billion, $8.8 Billion, and $9.0 Billion, respectively.  These costs 
include damage directly caused by the malicious code and the administrative costs to 
correct the infected systems, including the initial cleansing and repair of the systems.  
Companies must now maintain a constant vigil against malicious actors by keeping staff 
updated and equipment protected against future attacks.  However, the largest financial 
impact is the loss of the ability to conduct business [Lem03]. 
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The large financial impact of these various malicious logics show organizations 
need to analyze their operation and capabilities to detect and even prevent future attacks.  
Researchers and the computing community must understand the operation of malicious 
logic to provide an effective detection, prevention, and response to future attacks. 
 1.2 Overview and Goals 
This research determines through the use of mathematical simulation and live 
analysis of malicious code on an infected system, whether the Slammer based routing 
worm proposed by Zou is faster than the previously observed Slammer worm [ZTG05].  
This research also determines through those same simulations and analyses whether the 
Single Slash Eight (SSE) routing worm proposed in this research is faster than the 
Slammer based routing worm proposed by Zou [ZTG05].  A third goal of this research is 
to analyze the statistical randomness of the IP addresses generated by the Slammer worm 
to establish a basis for the use of random number generators in the mathematical models 
used to generate infection rates.  As part of the validation effort, the Matlab mathematical 
model simulation is compared to previously observed Slammer data.  The final goal of 
this research is to compare the various 2003 scanning worm infection, the year Slammer 
was originally released, to the speed that could be possible on computing systems of 
today. 
1.3 Thesis Overview 
Chapter 1 provides a brief synopsis of the motivation for this research, an 
overview of the experiment, the goals of the research, and an overview of the thesis 
structure.  Chapter 2 covers the basics of malicious logic operation with particular 
4 
emphasis on worms and delves into the previous research conducted in the area of 
worms.  Modeling of the Internet, Internet protocol addressing, and the concept of the 
continual increase of computing system speed are also addressed.  
A detailed explanation of the experimental design is provided in Chapter 3 
including the problem definition with the goals and hypothesis, the experimental 
approach, and the assumptions and limitations for this research.  Chapter 3 also discusses 
the system boundaries and services, the workload for the system, and performance 
metrics used in this research.  The parameters and factors that form the basis of this 
research are also discussed.  Finally, the evaluation technique, experiment design and 
configuration, and a discussion of the analysis and interpretation for this research are 
discussed.   
The results and analysis of the data collected are presented in Chapter 4.  The first 
section determines the packet generation capabilities of the original Slammer worm.  The 
second section analyzes the randomness of the Slammer worm IP address generation.  
The third section determines the infection rates of the original Slammer worm and the 
Slammer routing worm proposed by Zou [ZTG05].  Chapter 4 demonstrates the speed 
difference between the worms on systems available today compared to that in use during 
the original Slammer worm outbreak.  Chapter 4 ends with the coverage of the Single 
Slash Eight routing worm developed herein.   
Chapter 5 is a short summary of the research problem and conclusions.  The 
contributions and significance to the computing community and recommendations for 
future research are also contained in Chapter 5.  
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Throughout this thesis to improve the readability and flow, the research cited 
directly in the thesis text is referred to by the last name of the first author credited in that 
research.  As such, the research performed and data created by Zou et al [ZTG05] in their 
research of routing worms will be referred to simply as Zou.  The Slammer worm 
research completed by Wei et al  [WMS05] is referred to as Wei and so on.  There are 
two Slammer analyses cited in this research that were completed by Moore et al [MPS03] 
[MPW03] where the same authors wrote both documents.  Both of these are referred 
within the text by simply Moore however, the end citation specifically names which 
research the information came from.   
1.4 Summary 
This chapter provides a brief synopsis of the motivation for this research with an 
introduction to the significant impact caused by malicious logic.  The goals, with an 
overview, of the experiment for this thesis was provided in Section 1.2.  Finally, an 
overview of the structure of this document was presented in Section 1.3. 
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the fundamentals of worm propagation and recent research 
into worm propagation and modeling.  Section 2.2 discusses the basics of computer 
worms and their operation when released onto a network, as well as a more detailed 
analysis of the routing worms being assessed in the experiment.  Section 2.3 investigates 
the difficult process of accurately simulating the Internet.  The discussion of the division 
of Internet addresses is given in Section 2.4.  Within Section 2.5, the concept of Moore’s 
law as it relates to the increasing speed of computing systems is examined.  Section 2.6 
discusses previous worm propagation modeling, results, and limitations.  Finally, Section 
2.7 summarizes all of the previous sections. 
2.2 Worms 
This research considers the operation of random address scanning computer 
worms across an IPv4 network.  One of the major reasons computer worms work so well 
is that Microsoft Windows, the operating system used throughout the world, has a market 
share of 94% [Fes04].  This homogeneity, or genetically similar software makeup, has 
both negative consequences and provides the consumer great benefits.  The benefits 
include lower cost products, easier portability and increased services.  The consequences 
associated with this homogeneity are the ease with which a malicious logic program can 
move from system to system. 
The cost of malicious logic to consumers, companies, and the government is the 
motivation for this research.  It is estimated that computer virus attacks caused $55 
7 
billion in damages in 2003 and that sum was on the rise in 2004 [Mar04].  With the costs 
from the damages skyrocketing and money to prevent and protect against malicious logic 
becoming a mandatory expenditure, one can easily see that malicious logic is and has 
been a serious threat to home computer users, businesses, and the Internet community in 
general. 
Dr. Fred Cohen coined the term “computer virus” in 1984 due to the similarity to 
their biological counterparts plaguing the human race [Sla95].  His research formed the 
basis for the epidemiological models.  If system A can infect system B, and system B can 
infect system C then system A can infect system C [KeW91].  Since that initial 
comparison, a virus has been defined as “a set of instructions which, when executed, 
spreads itself to other, previously unaffected, programs or files” [Hof90].   However, this 
does not fully define malicious code, as some malicious code requires a user to open an 
attachment or possibly an email.  In these cases the user is not “directly” acting upon the 
code; they are activating the “trigger” (e.g., the opening of an attachment).  A more 
complete definition of malicious logic is a program that “modifies or destroys data, steals 
data, allows unauthorized access, exploits or damages a system” [Hei04] and in general 
“does something that the user did not intend” [Hei04]. 
Although, computer viruses are not  “living” entities with the ability to build up 
“immunities,” the programmers of malicious logic are becoming better at creating and 
writing malicious code.  This, in effect, makes the viruses more resilient to correction, 
detection and prevention, and more tenacious in their ability to infect new systems.  This 
problem of evolution makes defending against and defeating malicious code more 
difficult with every new generation and makes computer viruses similar in that sense to 
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their biological counterparts [ZTG05].  Given that expectation, each worm’s infection 
rate should be faster than the last; the SSE routing worm should be faster than the 
Slammer based routing worm which should be faster than the original Slammer worm. 
Worms are often confused with viruses.  This confusion is due to the merging of 
malicious code techniques and the blurring of the lines between application operations.  
Worms, unlike viruses, have tended in the past to not directly harm the system they are 
on.  Worms replicated in the background and most computers continued to operate.  The 
Witty worm was an exception to this.  It contained code that randomly deleted portions of 
a hard drive attached to the system it was residing on [ShM04].  Even so, all worms are 
malicious actors.  First, worms perform actions not intended by the owner of the system.  
Worms often increase in size filling up a hard drive, perform data mining, and can bring 
Internet communication to a standstill through the flooding of the Internet with 
overwhelming amounts of infected packets. 
A proper definition of a worm is a form of malicious code, either standalone or 
file infecting, that acts with or without human intervention and spreads across a network 
[KiE03].  This simple definition combines all the aspects of a worm while separating it 
from a virus or a Trojan horse.  A Trojan Horse is a set of malicious code that is hidden 
within another program, much like the mythical Trojan Horse of the Greeks.  Viruses 
differ from worms in that, a worm does not attach directly to another object or program; 
worms are standalone code.  Worms, unlike Trojan horses, replicate for further infections 
[KiE03]. 
Worms can be classified into three groups based on how they operate: E-mail (or 
client application) worms, Windows file sharing worms, and traditional worms [KiE03].  
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E-mail worms, as the name suggests, exploit weaknesses in an e-mail system or in 
application software to propagate (e.g., Melissa [KiE03] used e-mail, and Bilbrog 
[KiE03] used Internet Relay Chat).  This style of worm usually requires some form of 
user action, such as opening an e-mail attachment.  Windows file sharing worms exploit 
the various file sharing capabilities (i.e., Server Message Block and Common Internet 
File System) of Windows that allow small groups to work on the same files (e.g., Nimda 
and Gaobot worms [KiE03]).  Traditional worms attack using standard Internet protocols 
(e.g., TCP/IP, UDP) and operate autonomously once activated [KiE03].  Within this class 
of traditional worms are the scanning worms.  Code Red, Slammer, Witty, and the 
Slammer based routing worm proposed by Zou are all types of scanning worms [ZTG05].  
They all probe the available IP address space to find and infect vulnerable systems 
[ZTG05]. 
2.2.1 Pseudo Random Number Generation in Worms 
All scanning worms use some form of Pseudo Random Number Generation 
(PRNG).  As the name implies, a PRNG generates pseudo random numbers for use in 
various applications.  The problem with PRNG is that it is not a truly random process but 
rather an algorithm that generates a sequence of numbers with little or no discernable 
pattern present in the sequence [Bla06].  This means that no matter how random the 
numbers generated appear to be, they are predictable.  Thus, if a person knows the 
number that “seeded” the PRNG they will be able to predict the series of numbers 
generated by the algorithm [Haa99].  However, for the purpose of generating a varied 
distribution of numbers to be used as target addresses, the PRNG works well as has been 
shown by the speed at which the worms studied in this research propagate. 
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2.2.2 Code Red 
Code Red was released on the Internet at 1000 hrs UTC on 13 July 2001 and 
exploited a vulnerability in the Windows Internet Information Services (IIS) that was 
discovered almost a month earlier by eEye [MSB02].  Windows IIS is a web server 
architecture for managing website and application availability.  The vulnerability was an 
error in the Window IIS Indexing Services that allowed a remote intruder to run arbitrary 
code on the victim system [CER02].  Code Red had an error in its random number 
generator that limited its ability to scan for IP addresses and so its propagation speed was 
inadvertently restricted.   Code Red version II (hereafter called Code Red as the two 
versions operated identically other than the random number generator), released six days 
after Code Red, corrected this coding error in the random number generator and infected 
systems at an exponential rate.  Code Red generated 100 scanning threads; each thread 
randomly selected an IP address and tried to set up a connection on port 80. Code Red 
was programmed to scan the IP address space uniformly [MSB02].   
An unusual characteristic of the scanning threads was that the 100th thread would 
try to deface the currently infected system’s web site if it was an English Windows 2000 
system.  If the target of the 100th thread was not an English Windows 2000 system, the 
thread would be used to infect other systems rather than trying to deface the web site.  
Once infected, the system would become a platform for launching new attacks.  If the 
target system was not a web server or it could not be infected, the thread would generate 
a new random IP address and try again [MSB02]. 
The Code Red worm could only infect a Windows system with IIS installed.  At 
the time, Microsoft estimated there were six million Windows IIS servers on the Internet.  
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However, Code Red was programmed with a stop time and did not have the opportunity 
to infect the entire population.  It stopped its propagation at 0000 hrs UTC on 19 July 
2001 after infecting an estimated 359,000 computers in less than 14 hours.  The cost of 
this worm was estimated to be in excess of $2.6 billion [MSB02].   
As Code Red was, at the time, one of the most aggressive worms observed, there 
have been many experiments and research projects analyzing its operation.  Code Red 
was one of the worms used by Zou as a basis for validating the speed of their proposed 
routing worms.  The Zou routing worm research is discussed in more detail in Section 
2.2.4 [ZTG05]. 
2.2.3 Slammer 
Slammer, also known as SQL Slammer and Sapphire, did not attack the end 
system computers (i.e., the personal home computer), but it wreaked havoc by virtually 
shutting down portions of the Internet as it spread itself among the core servers and 
throughout Internet [HyE03].  Core servers provide Internet access for multiple 
computers at a company or small network.  Of the 13 Internet root name servers, the 
servers that form the essence of the domain name system, five were shutdown by 
Slammer traffic and close to 20% of all data sent across the Internet was lost during the 
outbreak [HyE03].  Slammer was the fastest spreading worm ever observed [MPS03].  It 
doubled the number of infected systems every 7.5 – 9.5 seconds in the first minute and 
managed to infect over 90% of its potential 75,000 victims in about 10 minutes [MPS03]. 
Slammer operated by exploiting a “buffer overflow” vulnerability in the 
Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Operating System by gaining access to the computer 
memory stack and replicating itself.  Slammer sent massive amounts of data across the 
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Internet during its attempt to infect other systems; reaching over 55 million scans per 
second in just three minutes [MPS03].  The small size of Slammer added to its 
effectiveness by allowing it to be sent in a short time.  This small size provided an 
additional benefit of initially hiding its existence since the large file transfers prevalent on 
the Internet masked its presence.  Even with the small size of 404 bytes, the amount of 
data being sent across the Internet by Slammer during the three minute interval was over 
23,000 gigabytes every second. 
Also aiding Slammer’s effectiveness was its use of User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) for communication [HyE03].  UDP allows transmission with no requirement to 
establish a return path acknowledgement.  This meant Slammer could scan the Internet 
without concern for establishing a connection to the targets, thereby further increasing its 
speed.  The consequences could have been much worse; Slammer had a small flaw in its 
program that limited the number of Internet system addresses it could scan for infection 
[MPS03].  However, this did not appear to impact the speed at which Slammer was able 
to spread.  This flaw did, however, limit the ability of researchers to calculate the IP 
address range vulnerable to the Slammer worm, as they had been able to do with previous 
worms [MPS03]. 
2.2.4 The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and /8 Routing Worms 
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and “/8” routing worms are malicious code 
proposed by Zou [ZTG05].  These worms are an advanced form of malicious code using 
two techniques to increase their speed of infecting vulnerable systems and creating an 
overload of malicious packet traffic on the Internet backbone. 
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The BGP routing worm is, as the name implies, a scanning of the BGP routing 
tables for valid computer addresses to attack.  The BGP routing worm is named after the 
protocol used by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) of various tier sizes as their inter-
autonomous system routing protocol to exchange information between ISPs.  The BGP 
routers contain ISP IP addresses, and Zou proposed an autonomous worm that harvests 
valid IP address tables from the BGP routers.  Thus, this makes the BGP routing worm a 
more precise Internet scannerand should be at least three times faster than any previous 
worm [ZTG05].  The second capability of a BGP routing worm is the ability to attack, 
say, only a specific country, company, Internet service provider, due to the inherent 
geographical information in routing tables [ZTG05]. 
The “/8” routing worm implements similar techniques with one difference from 
the BGP routing worm.  Instead of a large block of code to query the BGP routers for 
their prefixes to hone the worm’s search, the “/8” routing worm is pre-coded with the 116 
IPv4 “/8” routable addresses.  This reduces the amount of code required and therefore the 
size compared to the BGP routing worm.  Inserting the 116 IPv4 “/8” routable address 
prefixes would only increase Slammer’s size by 116 bytes to 520 bytes [ZTG05].  The 
code to perform this modification was not available in published research.   
Due to the public availability of the BGP routing tables, developing an effective 
worm is comparatively easy because the tables provide a known good range of Internet 
protocol addresses to attack which make the worm spread more effectively by reducing 
the required scanning space without the risk of missing a target.  As of September 2003, 
over 28% of the IPv4 addresses were BGP routable, reducing the required scanning space 
by almost 70% [ZTG05].   
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In addition to spreading quicker and being able to target a specific region or range 
of IP addresses for attack, there are two other challenges that make the worms 
problematic for the Internet community.  First, the BGP and “/8” routing worm can cause 
even more congestion than Slammer because the IP addresses generated by the routing 
worms are inherently BGP routable.   Unlike the other traditional scanning worms 
including Slammer which use TCP/UDP that can be easily dropped if the generated 
address is invalid, the addresses generated by a BGP worm are always valid at the BGP 
router and therefore forwarded. Since Slammer and other worms scan the entire IPv4 
address space 70% of their IP addresses generated are non-routable and dropped 
[ZTG05].  Therefore, a majority of the traffic generated by Slammer, did not even appear 
on the Internet backbone and did not cause any congestion.  Despite this fact, Slammer 
caused severe congestion to several local area networks and the Internet as a whole.   
The second challenge presented by the BGP and “/8” routing worms is they are 
more difficult to detect compared to previously observed scanning worms (e.g. Code 
Red, Slammer, Witty).  One of the major identifiers used to track scanning worms is the 
large amount of traffic generated without response.  Because the BGP and “/8” routing 
worms generate packets that will be dropped by the routers and furthermore since the 
failed responses would be delayed due to the routability of the infection packets, 
detecting the worm based on an illegal traffic method would be slow [ZTG05]. 
2.2.5 The BGP Routing Worm Propagation 
The BGP and “/8” routing worms were based on a mathematical model that 
reflects the actual propagation parametrics observed in previous worms.  The infection 
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rate of the BGP and /8 routing worms were modeled using a uniform-scan worm model 
described as [ZTG05] 
( )ttt INIdt
dI
-
W
=
h
      (1) 
where It is the number of hosts infected at time t, N is the number of vulnerable systems, 
η is the scanning rate, and W is the address space requiring scanning.  Using Code Red as 
a basis, the BGP and /8 routing worm infect rates versus the observed Code Red rates are 
shown in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2. Zou Code Red Worm Simulation 
The values used for the comparison were η = 358 scans per minute, N = 360,000, 
and It  = 10 systems infected.  The address space to scan, W, was set to 4,294,967,296 for 
the Code Red infection curve and 1.95 billion for the 116 Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA) “/8” BGP routable addresses for the “/8” routing worm.  The BGP 
routing worm had all of the same variables except for the available address space.  For 
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the BGP routing worm W was set to 1,228,360,647 to reflect the further refinement of the 
scanned address space.  The outcome of this experiment showed that both the BGP and /8 
worms operated significantly faster; more than 3 times as fast as the Code Red worm 
[ZTG05].  Unlike the Zou Slammer-based worms (discussed below), there were no 
changes in the scan rate made in the Zou Code Red-based Worms due to the the increase 
of code size required to make the routing worms [ZTG05]. 
The model of Slammer as a “/8” routing worm was developed using the uniform-
scan worm model with η = 4000 scans per minute, N = 100,000, and It  = 10 systems 
infected [ZTG05].  The address space to scan, W, was set to 1,946,156,941 addresses.  
The Slammer “/8” routing worm, referred to as the “routing Slammer worm,” used the 
same values for N and It.   However, to reflect the reduced address space of a “/8“ routing 
worm and the increased code size of 520 bytes to incorporate the “/8” routing worm code 
into Slammer, W was set to 1.95 billion and η was set to 3108.  
A complete list of the variables used by Zou is provided in Table 1.  The data 
revealed that the new “routing Slammer worm” (hereafter called the Zou Slammer 
routing worm) was more than twice as fast as the original Slammer infection rate as 
shown in Figure 3 [ZTG05].  
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Figure 3. Zou Slammer Worm Simulation 
Table 1. Zou Worm Simulation Variables 
 
Number of IP 
addresses
Number of 
Vulnerable 
Systems 
Packet 
Generation 
Speed
Initial Number of 
Infected Systems
Code Red Worm 4,294,967,296 360,000 358 per Minute Ten
Zou Code Red "/8" 
Routing Worm 1,946,156,941 360,000
358 per 
Minute Ten
Zou Code Red BGP 
Worm 1,228,360,647 360,000
358 per 
Minute Ten
Zou Slammer Worm 4,294,967,296 100,000 4,000  per Second Ten
Zou Slammer 
Routing Worm 1,946,156,941 100,000
3,108 per 
Second Ten
 
2.3 Internet Modeling 
Due to the Internet’s complexity, rapid growth, and constant change, any attempt 
at modeling it will be severely limited.  Mathematical models, software simulations, and 
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hardware simulations all suffer from a lack of size or ability to effectively mimic the 
operation of the Internet.  The biggest problem any model of the Internet is its inability to 
model the true vastness of the global Internet community [FlP01].  There were an 
estimated 16 million users in December of 1995 [Gro03], [IWS07].  The number of users 
has increased to 1,093 million by December of 2006 [IWS07].  Even the most advanced 
computer simulation software falls far short of being able to represent that many nodes on 
a network.   
Another problem with simulating the Internet is heterogeneity.  The Internet, 
while dominated by Microsoft products, is not a network of similar computers.  There are 
differences in platforms, link sizes, data rates, and network topologies that increase the 
difficulty in accurately simulating the Internet even further.  Also confusing the issue are 
the differences in protocols used by these varied systems and networks.  Each of these 
protocols has their own operating characteristics, formats, and traffic loads to consider to 
generate an accurate model [FlP01].    
A third area of concern is the difficulty in representing the amount of traffic load.  
The Internet has congestion control techniques and dynamic routing capability.  
Simulating this adds significant complexity to a model.  Further, Internet traffic is not 
constant.  The high traffic pattern for each network follow the same pattern as an average 
workday; the traffic tends to increase as the workday begins, tails off over the lunch 
period, starts to climb again after lunch until the end of the workday, and finally exhibits 
some increase in the evening hours after dinner that has been attributed to 
home/recreational computer use [FlP01].   Figure 4, shows a typical traffic pattern of 
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several states in the United States that exhibit this pattern for a rise as the workday begins 
and a falloff of traffic as nightfall occurs [Whe02]. 
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Figure 4. Pattern of Daily Network Traffic 
The final factor presented by Floyd and Paxson is that a model of the Internet will 
likely not be useful tomorrow.  The Internet changes everyday in its operation, size, and 
use.  Some of the areas that make the future Internet difficult to predict are pricing 
structures, the explosive growth of wireless, and the currently undeveloped new “killer 
application” [FlP01]. 
2.4 Internet Protocol Addressing 
IPv4 is the predominant protocol used for Internet communication today, but on 
the horizon is the IPv6.  IPv4 has an address space of 232 yielding 4,294,967,296 IP 
addresses.  However, due to the reserved IP ranges and limitations on the range usable by 
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Internet community, there are just over 3.5 billion useable IP addresses [WaC02].  Sixty-
five percent of the IPv4 address space is assigned to the United States and the growth of 
the Internet in Europe and Asia is causing problems with a lack of available address 
space [Huf03].  
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) assigns and manages the available 
Internet address for the world.  From the IANA the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) 
receive large groups of IP addresses.  These RIRs manage their assigned smaller 
addresses and distribute an even smaller range to the large Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) for their area of responsibility.  In turn, the large ISPs provide Internet connection 
service to the smaller local ISPs and end users.   
Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) is a prefix based standard for the 
interpretation of IP address groupings to allow easier use and discussion.  The slash 
number designation, such as “/8,” denotes the prefix aggregation of the IP address from 
the full 32 bit IPv4 address.  Thus, a “/8” takes the 32 bit IPv4 address from 
approximately 4.3 billion possible addresses and reduces the address to the last 24 bits as 
the first 8 bits are masked.  This reduces the IPv4 address space under consideration to 
16,777,216.  This “/8” grouping is the typical CIDR size provided to the RIRs for 
dispersal to the ISPs. 
The “/8” routing worm reduces the overall IPv4 address space by instituting a 
CIDR “/8” allocation table as part of its functionality [ZTG05].  Therefore, out of the 
possible 256 “/8” address groups, only 116 are IANA IP routable addresses.  Based on 
these restrictions and reserved addresses dedicated under the authority of IANA, the 
scanning required by a “/8” routing worm is reduced to 45.3% of the IPv4 address space 
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[ZTG05].  This means that instead of scanning the entire 4.3 billion IPv4 address space as 
Slammer did, a CIDR “/8” based routing worm would only have to scan 1.95 billion 
addresses. 
2.5 Increasing Speed of Technology 
The speed of both the Internet and computers is increasing each year.  According 
to the often-quoted Moore’s Law, the speed of computer processing power roughly 
doubles every 18 months.  Thus, if one uses Moore’s Law to compute the difference in a 
computer attached to the Internet between 2003 and 2006, the system in 2006 should be 
about 4 times faster.  Moore’s Law has been used to predict everything from disk storage 
capacity to digital camera resolution.   Others have estimated the increase of network 
capacity used Moore’s Law. 
In fact, the growth of the Internet has more than matched the estimates of Moore’s 
Law.  During 1996-2002, the traffic on the Internet backbones in the United States 
doubled every year and the infrastructure kept pace with this exponential growth [Odl03].  
As previously mentioned, the number of users increased 68 times in just eleven years 
from 16 million in 1995 to 1,093 million in 2006.  This does not follow the Moore’s Law 
rate of expansion.   
2.6 Related Research 
The primary focus of this research is to analyze the performance of the original 
Slammer worm, the Slammer routing wom as proposed by Zou, and the SSE routing 
proposed in this research on an IPv4 network [ZTG05].  The Slammer worm has been 
used in many worm studies where a mathematical model was developed to simulate its 
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effects [WMS05] [PeS04] [YuW04].  The BGP and “/8” routing worms are worms 
proposed by Zou and modeled mathematically to compare against the observations of 
Slammer and Code Red [ZTG05]. 
The Directed-Graph Epidemiological (DGE) model has been the basis for many 
worm models [KeW91].  It extended the standard epidemiological model to a directed-
graph model and uses in the analysis and simulation of viruses.   DGE applied the simple 
SIS (Susceptible -> Infected -> Susceptible) epidemiological model to various graphs to 
emulate the propagation of viruses [KeW91].  This was one of the first attempts at 
mathematically adapting virus propagation to the epidemiological model [KeW91] and 
became a reference for future mathematical malicious logic modeling [CGK03] [KRD04] 
[RSL04] [YuW04].   
Chen used a mathematical model of Code Red to study the propagation 
characteristics of worms [CGK03].  It was claimed that the model of Code Red closely 
matched the infection rate curve data collected from the original Internet introduction of 
Code Red, however no statistical basis for the claim was provided.  The model provided a 
formula for detecting, monitoring, and defending against further worm attacks and 
provided a way to understand worms and aid in the defense against them in the future 
[CGK03].  
Permulla and Sundaragopalan extended worm modeling to the packet- level.  
Their research developed a high-fidelity packet-level network simulation that emulated 
the operation of worms on the Internet and included some real operational subsystems.  
They included experiments with simulated live monitoring and defensive systems.  
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However, the monitoring and defense system was not included in the mathematical 
model of worm propagation [PeS04]. 
Wei Yu considered four classes of worms and characterized their operation 
through modeling and numerical analysis.  Yu analyzed pure random-based, peer-to-peer 
hit list-based, cooperation-based, and non-cooperation based strategies for worm 
operation.  The numerical analysis found the most effective worms used hit lists 
[YuW04].  This is similar to Zou when considering the “/8” routing worm as a form of 
“hit list” worm [ZTG05].  An epidemic model simulated the actions of worms on the 
Internet [YuW04]. 
The goal of the research performed by Joshua Hansen was to prove that a worm 
could be programmed to find exploits on a heterogeneous network and use those exploits 
to propagate without interaction with its creator.   Hansen defines a heterogeneous 
network environment as a network that has different operating systems; however, these 
systems have a common software program that could be exploited [Han03].  This is 
consistent with current Internet topology since, in 2004 Microsoft had the clear majority 
of operating systems on the Internet [Fes04].  Java was chosen as the basis for the Hansen 
exploit because of the wide use of Java across many operating systems including 
Microsoft and UNIX.   A six-node network using IPv4 with three real and three simulated 
nodes using a virtual machine was used for this simulation.  Of those nodes, the 
experiment included one real and one virtual node, which communicated wirelessly.  
Hansen did not use a live worm, but hard coded the exploit parameters into the modeling 
code and initially programmed an artificial vulnerability into each node [Han03].   
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Wei used Slammer data to validate a packet- level worm simulation on the Emulab 
test bed using a realistic background traffic model [WMS05].  Their initial research used 
the original Slammer data [MPW03], which consisted of 75,000 vulnerable systems and 
an average scan rate of 4,000 packets per second and mathematical models of worm 
propagation.  The worm propagation models were built using the variables of 
vulnerability ratio, scanning rate, infection delay, and scanning strategy.  The scanning 
strategy took into account how much of the address space the worm scanned and how the 
worm performed the scan.  It also modeled network congestion and network failures.  
The resulting infection rate curves, shown in Figure 5, include an estimate of how quickly 
a set of vulnerable system would be infected without network congestion [WMS05]. 
 
Figure 5. Wei Slammer Worm Simulation 
Figure 6 shows Slammer worm propagation with the constant and random 
background traffic values.  Wei observed that there was a negligible difference between 
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the infect rate of Slammer in the exponential and constant background traffic experiments 
and attributed this to Slammer using UDP packets that could easily overcome the model 
of the background traffic and congestion.  A worm based on TCP would likely exhibit a 
larger sensitivity to the background traffic values [WMS05].   
 
Figure 6. Wei Slammer Worm propagation with Network Congestion 
Wagner also used Slammer to validate models of network and bandwidth latency 
constraints.  The simulator was based on observed speed and connection data gathered 
from the peer-to-peer file sharing software Napster and Gnutella hosts.    During the 
Slammer portion of their research, Wagner created a 10-group network, set the initial 
number of infected systems at 100, and the vulnerable systems at 75,000 [WPD03].  The 
initial number of infected hosts appears to be arbitrarily assigned.  The research found the 
collected data matched the infection doubling rate observed during the original release of 
the Slammer worm and the overall scanning rate after three minutes [MPW03], but 
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deviated significantly from the observed propagation speed. This deviation was attributed 
to an increase in line speeds since Slammer was originally released [WMS05]. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of related research.  Specifically, the operation 
of malicious logic with an emphasis on worms is provided.  More detailed coverage of 
the Code Red, Slammer and routing worms and their previously observed propagation 
characteristics is also provided.  Each of the worms is a version of a scanning worm that 
is programmed to randomly scan the available address space.   
There have been many mathematical simulations and models of both Slammer 
and other scanning worms on IPv4 networks.  Only Perumalla, Sundaragopalan and 
Hansen tried to include actual operational systems into their research; however they did 
not use the actual worms [PeS04] [Han03].  Wei performed some detailed simulation of 
worm propagation using mathematical models and a network of computers [WMS05].  
Zou proposed and mathematically evaluated a pair of routing worms that proved to be 
faster than both the Code Red worm and the Slammer worm [ZTG05].  None of the 
previous research has involved re-releasing the Slammer worm onto an actual network to 
observe its effects for analysis. Rather, they relied on matching the previously observed 
data to build and validate their models. 
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III.  Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology used to create the experiment, the trials to 
test the hypotheses, and the data analysis.  Specifically, Section 3.2 present the problem 
definition including the goals and hypotheses, the approach and the experimental 
assumptions and limitations.  Sections 3.3 and 3.4 cover the system boundaries and 
system services.  The workload, consisting of the various worms tested in this research, is 
discussed in Section 3.5.  Section 3.6 covers the metrics collected.  The parameters and 
factors for this experiment are in Sections 3.7 and 3.8.  The techniques used for 
evaluating the data collected in this research are covered in Section 3.9.  The network 
configuration and the design of each worm tested is defined in Section 3.10.  Finally, 
Section 3.11 presents the analysis and interpretation of the results. 
3.2 Problem Definition 
3.2.1 Goals and Hypothesis 
The primary goal of this research is to characterize the ability of the original 
Slammer worm, the Slammer based routing worm proposed by Zou, and a new Single 
Slash Eight (SSE) routing worm proposed by this research to infect vulnerable systems 
within a given address space on an IPv4 network.  The infection rate of these routing 
worms across an IPv4 network are determined and their operation compared to the 
original Slammer worm.  This research also investigates the Slammer worm’s ability to 
generate a uniform random IP addresses in a given address space.  Finally, the 
28 
implications of the speed increase of computing systems available today versus those in 
use during the original Slammer release is discussed. 
Since the Slammer routing worm has only been studied through mathematical 
models [ZTG05], this research uses observed Slammer characteristics to mimic the 
expected operation of a Slammer routing worm by analyzing its ability to generate 
random IP addresses.  To evaluate the randomness of the Slammer IP address operation, 
each IP address generated will be evaluated as a whole and individually by octet.  The 
propagation speed of original Slammer worm, the Slammer routing worm, and the SSE 
routing worms are compared assuming a computing system from 2003 and a system in 
2007.  This is accomplished using data collected from a modern infected system for the 
2007 data and the use of the original Slammer characteristics for the 2003 data.  The 
experiment determines whether there is any significant difference between the 
propagation speeds in 2003 versus 2007. 
3.2.2 Approach 
The original Slammer worm code is sent to a vulnerable system, also called the 
victim, by a carrier workstation.  Once the infection packet is received at the victim, the 
worm code executes and the worm generates packets autonomously for further infections.  
These infection packets generated by the victim are collected and used to characterize the 
operation of the Slammer worm for simulation.  These measured propagation 
characteristics are combined with mathematical simulations and compared to the known 
statistics of the Slammer worm in the wild. 
The IP addresses of the Slammer infection packets are analyzed to determine the 
worm’s ability to generate uniform random addresses.  To ensure uniform distribution 
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within the IP addresses, each of the last three octets is evaluated individually to determine 
whether they are each uniformly random in distribution within their smaller address 
space.  Because the first octet is being simulated for the various routing worms, it can be 
represented by any valid octet value and is not germane to this experiment. 
Once the randomness has been determined, a mathematical simulation of 
infection rate is generated using the variables required for original Slammer, the Slammer 
routing worm, and the SSE routing worm.  Within the mathematical simulation, the size 
of the IP addresses available for scanning, the initial number of infected systems, and the 
number of vulnerable systems are controlled and modified based on the particular worm 
being evaluated. 
Finally, the propagation characteristics collected from the Slammer infected 
system are evaluated for their generation speed.  This data is compared to the original 
Slammer characteristics for the 2003 computing systems versus the current computing 
systems available in 2007. 
3.2.3 Assumptions and Limitations 
It is assumed that a future exploits allowing the propagation of a worm like 
Slammer will continue to occur.  The primary limitation of this experiment is the inability 
to accurately represent the Internet architecture as mentioned in Chapter 2.  Without the 
ability to represent the Internet or a large network, the true propagation characteristics of 
the worms is necessarily limited.    
3.3 System Boundaries 
The System Under Test (SUT) is an IP network known as the Network Under Attack.  As 
shown in Figure 7, the number of network nodes, protocol, topology, and links between 
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nodes are all components of the Network Under Attack.  The specific Component Under 
Test (CUT) is the Slammer worm, Slammer routing worm, and SSE routing worm.  
 
Figure 7. Network Under Attack 
3.4 System Services 
The service provided by this system is the transport of user data between nodes.  
The outcome of this service is success, failure, or degraded operation due to worm 
infection.  Failure could be due to worm infection preventing valid user data from 
crossing the network.   
An illegitimate but interesting use of the system service is the propagation of 
worms.  The outcome of this service is also success, failure, or degradation.  Success is 
defined as the transfer of a worm from one node to another.  Failure occurs when a worm 
cannot move from one node to another.  Degradation could be caused by the reduction of 
the worm’s capability to spread due to the large traffic load. 
31 
3.5 Workload 
The workload of the system is the worms.  The first worm, Slammer, provides a 
basis for validation on the IPv4 network.  The Slammer routing worm is compared to the 
results generated by Slammer to determine whether it is faster and to [ZTG05] for 
validation.  Lastly, the SSE routing worm is compared against both Slammer and the 
Slammer routing worm to determine how much faster it is. 
3.6 Performance Metrics 
The primary metric used in this experiment is the number of systems infected per 
second.  From the Matlab model of infection rate, the infection doubling rate can be 
calculated.  This rate is compared to the observed data validate the statistical model.  The 
known infection rate of Slammer on the Internet also provides a method to determine 
whether the Slammer routing worm and SSE routing worm spread faster than Slammer.  
The scanning rate is measured by the packets generated per second by an infected system 
for a given time period.  This metric is also used to compare scan rates between the 
systems available for infection during the original Slammer release and those in use 
today. 
3.7 Parameters 
3.7.1 System Parameters 
- Number of Nodes:  The number of nodes in this experiment is limited by a 
constant generation of a multicast address in the first octet that could not 
be resolved during this research effort.  Therefore, only one vulnerable 
node is available for use in the analysis of each worm. 
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- Link Data Rate:  As the congestion on a link increases due to network 
traffic, the data rate of that link and how much traffic it can carry impacts 
the spread of the worms.  The link data rate varies from link to link and 
cannot be adequately simulated in this research with the resources 
available.  Therefore, the variation in link capability is not a variable for 
consideration in this experiment and each link is a direct connection 
through a switch using Category 5e ethernet cable. 
- Operating System:  Worms normally target one particular operating 
system.  If the nodes of the network are not running the target operating 
system, the worm will not spread.  Consideration of how non-vulnerable 
nodes affect propagation is not considered.  The target host is always 
loaded with the vulnerable software component of Microsoft Server 2000, 
which the Slammer worm exploits. 
- IP Version:  IPv4 is used throughout this research.  This facilitates the 
baseline comparison of the worms under test against the known 
propagation characteristics of Slammer.   
- Year of the Computing System:  There are two time frames considered in 
this experiment; the year Slammer was originally released (2003) and year 
that this experiment takes place (2007).  These two time frames provide a 
comparison of the difference in speed of worms released onto systems 
used in 2003 to those in use today.  The use of the average Slammer worm 
scan rate observed in 2003 and the operation of the Slammer worm on a 
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computing system available today provides the baseline for this 
comparison. 
3.7.2 Workload Parameters 
- Worms:  The worms represent a malicious packet workload for the 
network to transport.  Each worm, the original Slammer, the Slammer 
routing worm, and the SSE routing worm, are all workload parameters in 
this experiment. 
3.8 Factors 
The factors is the workload and the year of the computing system.  There are three 
main worms considered in this experiment – the original Slammer worm, the Slammer 
routing worm, and the SSE routing worm.  The original Slammer worm is used as a 
baseline for comparison and validation of the other worms and mathematical simulation 
using the archived data and experimental data from other experiments.  How the 
capabilities of the Slammer routing worm and the SSE routing worms compare to the 
original Slammer worm is the focus of this experiment. 
The second set of factors is the difference in packet generation rate between the 
years 2003 and 2007.  The average Slammer worm packet generation rate from 2003 is 
used to establish the baseline for comparison to the data observed on a computing system 
of today.  To evaluate how a fast the Slammer worm, the Slammer routing worm and the 
SSE routing worm could propagate on a computing system of today, the actual 
observations of the scan rate of the Slammer code on the test network is used. 
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3.9 Evaluation Technique 
This experiment directly measures the generation of infection packets on a 
network.  This data and the originally observed Slammer scan rate is provided as the 
input variable of the packets generated per second to a mathematical model to provide 
infection rate data. 
Two laptops connected by a switch, both described in Appendix A, are used to 
simulate an attacking system and a vulnerable host.  The attacking system sends the 
infectious worm packet to the vulnerable host via UDP packet to infect that system.  
Once the vulnerable host receives the infection packet, that host becomes infected and 
begins to autonomously propagate the worm to randomly generated IP addresses. 
The validation of the worm operation and infection rate is accomplished by 
comparing previously collected Slammer data and experiments from [MPS03], 
[WMS05], and [ZTG05].  The randomness of the IP addresses is validated through the 
use of regression analysis and comparison to a statistically generated uniform distribution 
of the available address space. 
3.10 Experimental Design 
3.10.1 Network Configuration and System Infection Procedure 
The network configuration of the hardware for each run of the experiment uses 
the same components.  Each run consists of two laptops connected to a switch as shown 
in Figure 8 connected by category 5e ethernet cable. The specifications for each 
component are provided in Appendix A.  
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Figure 8. Network Configuration 
A detailed description of the Slammer code used for infecting the victim machine 
is provided in Appendix B with analysis of the assembly code and a diagram of stack 
operation.  The Slammer worm code is sent via a UDP packet to the victim machine 
using the Netcat tool.  Netcat wraps the Slammer binary code in a UDP packet and sends 
the completed packet to the destination address and port specified.  This is accomplished 
by invoking the Netcat software through the use of the command line as shown in Figure 
9.    
 
Figure 9. Netcat Infection Command 
Each new infection is initiated using this same command line interface.  The 
breakdown of the command is shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Netcat Infection Command Description 
 
nc -w2 129.249.92.11 -u -1434 < Slammer
Calls Netcat 
Program
Wait two seconds 
to close 
connection
Target IP Address
Open a UDP 
connection to port 
1434
Send the 
"Slammer" file to 
the Target  
3.10.2 Experimental Exploration of Slammer Randomness 
To establish a baseline for comparison, the Slammer packets are collected and 
used to build a statistical graph of the infection rate for comparison to the real world 
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observed operation of Slammer.  The first step in this process is to establish that the IP 
addresses generated by Slammer are statistically random.  The problem with the random 
number generator in Slammer is well documented in [MPS03] and [MPW03].  This flaw 
affects the first octet and is therefore not part of the experimental consideration in the 
generation of random IP addresses.  Only the last three octets are analyzed and used for 
the examination of randomness. 
The uniform distribution of the random addresses generated by Slammer is 
verified by analyzing the infection packets generated by Slammer as an entire IP address 
space of three octets and individually as to the randomness of the octets themselves.  To 
verify the statistical uniformity of the random numbers generated by Slammer, the total 
address space under consideration is divided into an evenly distributed groupings based 
on the number of samples taken.  The grouping is established by first taking the upper 
value range minus one to account for the value of zero to establish the upper range of the 
data set under evaluation.  This upper range is then divided by the number of samples 
taken which provides the statistical interval for each sample point.  The statistical interval 
is then multiplied by the sample event number to generated the statistical average for that 
sample point.  The sample event number and the statistical average are plotted on an 
“XY” scatter plot to generate a regression line for analysis of the data collected. 
For example, if the experiment called for a statistical spread of a single 
hexadecimal number with 20 samples the calculations would be as shown in Table 3.  To 
find the upper limit, the total possible values of single hexadecimal number, 16, is 
reduced by one to account for the value of zero.  This upper limit of 15 is divided by the 
number of samples taken of 20, which calculates the statistical interval of 0.75.  The 
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statistical interval of 0.75 is then multiplied by each sample event number including zero 
to generate the statistical average for the data set.   
Table 3. Statistical Model Example 
 
Samples 
Taken 20
Statistical 
Interval 0.75
Event No. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Statistical 
Average 0 0.75 1.5 2.25 3 3.75 4.5 5.25 6 6.75 7.5
Event No. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Statistical 
Average 8.25 9 9.75 10.5 11.25 12 12.75 13.5 14.25 15  
This data is then input into an “XY” scatter plot to show the relationship between 
the samples collected and values expected as shown in Figure 10.  The linearity of the 
data collected is compared to the statistical model to establish whether the data exhibits a 
similar linearity. 
Statistical Average
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Figure 10. Statistical Model Graph Example 
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The statistical similarity of the model to the data collected will prove whether the 
data collected is uniformly distributed and therefore statistically random across the 
available address space.  Table 4 provides sample points of the statistical model used for 
the single octet and combined octet experiments. 
Table 4. Experiment Statistical Model 
 
16 128 192 1024 4096 16384 65535
Single 
Octets 256 65535 0.00389105 0.062 0.498 0.747 3.9844 15.9377 63.751 255
Three 
Octets 16777216 65535 256.003891 4096 32768 49153 262148 1048592 4194368 16777215
Example Event ValueAddress 
Space
Range of 
Samples
Samples 
Taken
Statistical 
Interval
 
3.10.3 Matlab Model of Infection Rate 
The Matlab model used in this research produces a worm infection rate based on 
several variables.  An overview of the operation of the Matlab model code is provided 
here and in more detail in Appendix C.  The number of initially infected systems, the 
number of vulnerable systems and the number of possible addresses available for 
scanning are all entered into the model.  The number of vulnerable systems is a range that 
always starts at 1 and ends at the total number of vulnerable systems.  The Matlab model 
uses a pseudo random number generator to generate a number that represents an infection 
packet for an IP address of a system for each iteration of the code.  The Matlab model 
generates one of these numbers for each system infected prior to that iteration.  These IP 
address numbers are compared against the total number of remaining vulnerable systems.  
If the IP address numbers fall within the range of the vulnerable systems then the 
iteration number is documented and the available vulnerable systems is reduced by one.  
If the IP address is not within the range of the vulnerable systems then the Matlab model 
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continues to the next iteration.  This continues until the vulnerable systems are reduced to 
zero, which indicates that all of the vulnerable systems have been infected.  The Matlab 
model then generates the file containing the iteration numbers of when each system was 
infected, those numbers are entered into an Excel spreadsheet and multiplied by the 
packet per second rate the worm generates. 
For example, if the total number of vulnerable systems is 10, the number of 
possible addresses is 100, and the initially infected systems equals 1, then the Matlab 
code would generate one random number for the first iteration.  If the random number 
generated falls within the range of 1-10 then the iteration number is noted by the code 
and the number of vulnerable systems is reduced to 9.  On the next iteration, the Matlab 
code generates one random number for each of the two infected systems and compares 
those numbers to the remaining vulnerable systems.  An example of 5 iterations of the 
Matlab model code, including the first two iterations detailed above, are demonstrated in 
Table 5 for a worm packet per second rate of 1 second. 
 Table 5. Matlab Model Infection Rate Example 
 
Iteration
Number of 
Infected 
Systems
Number of 
Vulnerable 
Systems
Number of 
Addresses 
Available
Number of Pseudo 
Random Number 
Generated
Numbers 
Generated
Time of 
Infection 
in 
Seconds
1 1 10 100 1 7 1
2 2 9 100 2 83 & 59 2
3 2 9 100 2 3 & 60 -
4 3 8 100 3 12, 33, 72 4
5 3 8 100 3 45, 51, 90 -  
 From this information a graph of the infection rate curve can be generated as 
shown in Figure 11 where the data in Table 5 is extended exponentially. 
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Figure 11. Matlab Model Infection Rate Example 
3.10.4 Experimental Validation of Matlab Model Infection Rate Simulation 
Once the uniform distribution of the random packets generated by a Slammer-
infected system is verified, the Matlab model of worm infection rates is validated.  The 
verification of the mathematically generated infection rate is accomplished by comparing 
the curve generated by the Matlab model code (Section 3.10.3 and Appendix C) against 
the curves generated by previous research and the original observations of the Slammer 
worm from 2003.  The Matlab model is first compared against the Code Red worm, the 
Code Red “/8” routing worm, and the Code Red BGP routing worm experiments 
[ZTG05].  A more detailed comparison is performed against the Slammer worm’s 
original infection rate and the results found in the research of the Slammer worm 
completed by Wei and Zou [WMS05] [ZTG05].  Finally, the proposed SSE routing worm 
is compared against the Matlab models of the Slammer worms of 2003/2007 and the 
Slammer routing worms of 2003/2007. 
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As discussed in Section 3.10.3, the Matlab model generates an infection rate 
curve based on the variables of the initially infected systems, the number of vulnerable 
systems, and the size of the address space being scanned by the worm.  The Matlab 
model variables used to generate the infection rate curves for each of the worms tested in 
this research are described below and in Appendix C.  
3.10.4.1 Matlab Model Variables for the Code Red Worm Comparisons 
The Code Red worm simulations have a vulnerable population of 360,000 and an 
initial number of infected systems of 10.  The scan rate for the Code Red test is based on 
the observed rate of 358 scans per minute.  These values and the 4.3 billion possible 
addresses are provided to the Matlab model simulation as the input variables.  For ease of 
reference, Table 6 provides all of the variables used in the Matlab model for the three 
Code Red simulations. 
The Zou Code Red “/8” routing worm simulations consist of a vulnerable 
population of 360,000 and an initial number of infected systems of 10.  The scan rate for 
the Zou Code Red “/8” routing worm test remains at the observed Code Red rate of 358 
scans per minute.  However, to mimic the operation of the “/8” routing worm’s ability to 
reduce the address space required to scan the possible addresses are reduced to 
1,946,156,941. 
 The Zou Code Red BGP routing worm simulations have of a vulnerable 
population of 360,000 and an initial number of infected systems of 10.  The scan rate for 
the Zou Code Red BGP routing worm test remains at the observed Code Red rate of 358 
scans per minute.  However, because the Zou Code Red BGP routing worm further 
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refines the address space required for scanning the possible addresses are reduced to a 
total of 1,228,360,647.   
Table 6. Matlab Model Variables for Code Red Worms 
 
Number of IP 
addresses
Number of 
Vulnerable 
Systems 
Number of 
Iterations
Number 
of Trials
Initial 
Number of 
Infected 
Systems
Code Red 
Worm 4,294,967,296 360,000 10,000,000 1 Ten
Zou Code Red 
"/8" Routing 
Worm
1,946,156,941 360,000 500,000 1 Ten
Zou Code Red 
BGP Worm 1,228,360,647 360,000 500,000 1 Ten
 
Due to the number of vulnerable systems, and the results of the trial tests, this 
experiment is run only once as an evaluation of the Matlab model infection rate.  The 
remaining worm tests are examined more thoroughly to establish the validity of the 
Matlab model. 
3.10.4.2 Matlab Model Variables for the Zou Slammer Worm Comparisons 
At the time of Slammers release in January of 2003 the vulnerable population was 
estimated at 75,000 with 74,856 unique IP addresses observed [MPW03].  Unfortunately, 
the numbers used by Zou was arbitrarily set to100,000 for the number of vulnerable 
systems and 10 for number of initially infected systems [ZTG05].  The scan rate used for 
the Zou Slammer worm is 4,000 packets per second, which simulates the observed 
average of Slammer worm during its original run.  Table 7 provides the Matlab model 
variables used in the Zou Slammer worm simulations. 
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Table 7. Matlab Model Variables for Zou Slammer Worms 
 
Number of IP 
addresses
Number of 
Vulnerable 
Systems 
Number of 
Iterations
Number 
of Trials
Initial Number 
of Infected 
Systems
Zou Slammer Worm 4,294,967,296 100,000 10,000,000 20 Ten
Zou Slammer Routing 
Worm 1,946,156,941 100,000 500,000 20 Ten
 
The Zou Slammer routing worm is run in the Matlab model with the same 10 
initially infected systems as the Zou Slammer worm.  However, the number of IP 
addresses and scanning rate are changed to reflect the capabilities of the Zou Slammer 
worm.  The number of IP addresses available for scanning by the Zou Slammer routing 
worm is reduced to 1,946,156,941 to reflect the worm’s ability to reduce the required 
scanning space and the scan rate is decreased to 3,108 pps to reflect the larger packet size 
of 520 bytes. 
The Slammer worm simulations are run in the Matlab model 20 times and used to 
generate a mean infection rate curve with confidence level of 95%. 
3.10.4.3 Matlab Model Variables for the Slammer Worm Comparisons 
To more accurately represent the actual operation of the original Slammer worm, 
number of vulnerable systems is set to the 74,856 unique IP addresses observed in 2003 
is used for the Slammer worm 2003 model. Additionally, the number of initially infected 
systems is set to one since there was no evidence to support there was originally more 
than one initially infected system.  The scan rate used for the Slammer worm 2003 is set 
at the originally observed 4,000 packets per second.  Table 8 provides the Matlab model 
variables used in the Slammer worm 2003 and 2007 simulations. 
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The Slammer worm 2007 is run using the Matlab model with the same number of 
initially infected systems and vulnerable systems as the Slammer worm 2003.  However, 
the scanning rate is changed to 14,398 pps to reflect the observed capabilities of 
computing systems today.  
The Slammer worm simulations are run in the Matlab model 20 times and used to 
generate a mean infection rate curve with confidence level of 95%. 
Table 8. Matlab Model Variables for the Slammer Worms 
 
Number of IP 
addresses
Number of 
Vulnerable 
Systems 
Number of 
Iterations
Number 
of Trials
Initial Number 
of Infected 
Systems
Slammer Worm 2003 4,294,967,296 74,856 10,000,000 20 One
Slammer Worm 2007 4,294,967,296 74,856 10,000,000 20 One
 
3.10.4.3 Matlab Model Variables for the Slammer Routing Worm Comparisons 
Due to the use of an arbitrary number of 100,000 vulnerable systems and 10 
initially infected systems by Zou, the infection rate curve they generated does not 
accurately represent how a Slammer routing worm would have behaved in 2003.  To 
correct this problem, the Matlab model is used to generate a Slammer routing worm using 
the original 2003 Slammer worm numbers.  Thus, the number of vulnerable systems is set 
to the 74,856 unique IP addresses and the number of initially infected systems is set at 
one.  The scan rate used for the Slammer routing worm 2003 is set at the originally 
observed 3,108 packets per second as calculated by Zou because of the increase of the 
infection packet size to 520 bytes [ZTG05].  Table 9 provides the Matlab model variables 
used in the Slammer routing worm 2003 and 2007 simulations. 
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The Slammer routing worm 2007 is run using the Matlab model with the same 
number of initially infected systems and vulnerable systems as the Slammer routing 
worm 2003.  However, the scanning rate is changed to 11,187 pps to reflect the increased 
packet generation capabilities of computing systems today.  
The Slammer routing worm simulations are run in the Matlab model 20 times and 
used to generate a mean infection rate curve with confidence level of 95%. 
Table 9. Matlab Model Variables for the Slammer Routing Worms 
 
Number of IP 
addresses
Number of 
Vulnerable 
Systems 
Number of 
Iterations
Number 
of Trials
Initial Number 
of Infected 
Systems
Slammer Routing 
Worm 2003 1,946,156,941 74,856 500,000 20 One
Slammer Routing 
Worm 2007 1,946,156,941 74,856 500,000 20 One
 
3.10.4.4 Matlab Model Variables for the SSE Routing Worm Comparisons 
For the analysis of the SSE routing worms proposed in this research, the number 
of vulnerable systems is reduced to the size of one “/8” grouping of IP addresses.  The 
total 74,856 vulnerable systems are divided by the 116 “/8” routable addresses.  This 
makes the total vulnerable population within each “/8” set scanned by the SSE routing 
worm 645 systems. The number of IP addresses scanned by the SSE routing worm is also 
reduced to 16.7 million.  This represents the total of the 1.95 billion available for normal 
Slammer routing worm divided into the 116 “/8” ranges.  Due to the size of the SSE 
routing worm only increasing the original Slammer worm code by eight bytes, the 
packets per second rate is set at 3,922.   Table 10 provides the Matlab model variables 
used in the SSE routing worm 2003 and 2007 simulations. 
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The SSE routing worm 2007 is run in the Matlab model with the same number of 
initially infected systems and vulnerable systems as the SSE routing worm 2003.  
However, the scanning rate is changed to 14,118 pps to reflect the increased packet 
generation capabilities of computing systems today. 
 The SSE routing worm simulation is run in the Matlab model 50 times using the 
previously identified 16.7 million addresses and 645 vulnerable systems.  This curve is 
compared to the previous worm simulations for analysis of similarity.  
Table 10. Matlab Model Variables for the SSE Routing Worms 
 
Number of IP 
addresses
Number of 
Vulnerable 
Systems 
Number of 
Iterations
Number 
of Trials
Initial Number 
of Infected 
Systems
SSE Routing Worm 
2003 16,777,216 645 500,000 50 One
SSE Routing Worm 
2007 16,777,216 645 500,000 50 One  
3.10.5 Experimental Examination of the Slammer Scanning Rate 
Packet generation rate by original Slammer worm is collected from the testbed 
network to provide another point of comparison with the real world observations.  The 
packets are collected after the initial infection is complete and the infected system is 
automatically generating infection packets.  The mean difference in inter-arrival time 
between each packet is measured for the collection period.  Twenty separate collections 
of infection packets are used to generate the packet per second rate. 
From the packet generation analysis, the speed of an average 2007 computing 
system is estimated and used to generate a comparison between the worm speeds of today 
versus those possible in 2003.  For these tests, the original Slammer worms, the Slammer 
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routing worms, and the SSE routing worms are set to their respective available address 
scanning spaces and vulnerable systems as shown in Table 11. 
Table 11. Worm Variables for Year Simulations 
 
Number of IP 
addresses
Number of 
Vulnerable 
Systems 
Number of 
Iterations
Number 
of Trials
Initial Number 
of Infected 
Systems
Slammer Worm 
2003 4,294,967,296 74,856 10,000,000 20 One
Slammer Worm 
2007 4,294,967,296 74,856 10,000,000 20 One
Slammer Routing 
Worm 2003 1,946,156,941 74,856 500,000 20 One
Slammer Routing 
Worm 2007 1,946,156,941 74,856 500,000 20 One
SSE Routing 
Worm 2003 16,777,216 645 500,000 50 One
SSE Routing 
Worm 2007 16,777,216 645 500,000 50 One
 
3.10.6 Examination of the Slammer Infection Doubling Rate 
From the Matlab model simulations of the Slammer worm 2003 variable numbers 
an infection doubling rate is developed for comparison to the 8.5 (+/-1) second estimated 
by Moore [MPW03].  This estimated global infection doubling rate is calculated for 
65,536 systems, which is the largest number of vulnerable systems attainable prior to the 
limit of 74,856 possible systems.  The Moore research noted, the original Slammer worm 
doubling rate was only estimated for the first minute [MPW03].  Therefore, in addition to 
the complete doubling rate curve, a more detailed analysis of the first 60 seconds is 
provided.  Then Matlab model of the Slammer worm 2003 doubling rate is compared 
original Slammer worm infection doubling rate curve for evaluation of their similarity. 
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3.11 Analysis and Interpretation of Results 
There are many aspects of the Slammer worm investigated in this research, the 
first of which is the packet per second generation speed.  The packets generated per 
second by the Slammer worm infected system on the testbed network are analyzed and 
compared to the observed number of packets per second generated by Slammer in 
January 2003.  This provides a basis for the calculating the time for each potential victim 
to be infected on the current Internet, which allows the speed of infection to be 
determined that could be expected if the worms were released on a network today. 
This research investigates the Slammer worm’s ability to generate a uniform 
random IP addresses in a given address space through the use of statistical comparison.  
Based on the comparison of the destination IP addresses of infection packets collected to 
the statistically generated regression line the uniform distribution of the Slammer worm’s 
IP address generation is established.  The similarity between these is evaluated to 
establish the uniformity of distribution. Further, to determine if the Slammer worm is 
generating the random IP addresses in a non-random pattern, lag plots of the data are 
created to analyze for existence of an observable pattern.  The presence of a pattern 
demonstrates the numbers are in fact correlated.  The combination of the analysis of the 
uniform distribution and lag plots provide this research to determine the statistical 
randomness of the Slammer worm’s generation of IP addresses. 
The Matlab model of worm infection rates is compared to previous research for 
validation and analysis of the original Slammer worm, the Slammer routing worm, and 
the SSE routing worm.  The first Matlab Model comparison made is to the Code Red 
worm research performed by Zou [ZTG05].  The Matlab model of the Code Red worm, 
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the Zou Code Red BGP routing worm, and the Zou Code Red “/8” Routing is analyzed 
for similarity to the of the Zou infection rates of those worms [ZTG05].  The Matlab 
model of the original Slammer worm infection rate is compared to the observed Slammer 
characteristics from January 2003 and to the results of the Wei and Zou research 
[WMS05], [MPS03], [MPW03], and [ZTG05].  As part of this comparison of the Matlab 
model to the Slammer worm’s operational characteristics, the Matlab model rate of 
infected systems doubling versus that observed by Moore is performed [MPW03].  If the 
comparisons show a close relationship, then the Matlab model simulations can be 
considered representative of how the original Slammer worm operates.   
The  Matlab model is used to generate the infection rate curves for comparison of 
the original Slammer worm 2003 and how the Slammer worm operates on a system of 
today.  The Slammer routing worm is also generated by the Matlab model for the 2003 
and 2007 computing system operation.  These four worms, the Slammer worm 2003/2007 
and the Slammer routing worm 2003/2007, are compared to determine the speed 
differences between each other.  These differences will determine how fast each worm is 
in relation to each other and characterizes their infection rate.   
Finally, the SSE routing worm is modeled by Matlab to characterize its infection 
rate.  Then the SSE routing worm 2003/2007 are calculated and compared to the 
Slammer worm 2003/2007 and Slammer routing worm 2003/2007 for determination of 
the speed difference between them.  These final comparisons provide the ability to 
determine which of these worms is the fastest at infecting a vulnerable population. 
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3.12 Summary 
This chapter discusses the methods used to analyze the propagation of the original 
Slammer worm, the Slammer Routing worm, and the SSE routing worm across an IPv4 
network.  This chapter defines under consideration for this research, the goals and 
hypothesis, the approach taken to complete this experiment, and the assumptions and 
limitations bounding this research.  In this chapter, the system boundaries, the services 
provided by the system, and the workload of the system is covered.  The metrics used in 
the measurement of performance, the description of the system and workload parameters, 
and the factors are discussed in this chapter.  The techniques used for evaluating the data 
and a detailed explanation of the experiment design is provided.  This chapter concludes 
with coverage of the analysis and interpretation of the results generated by the 
experiments in this research.  
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
This chapter presents the results and analysis of the data collected from the 
experiment simulations of the worm infections.  Section 4.1 covers the collection and 
analysis of Slammer’s packet per second generation.  Section 4.2 examines the 
randomness of Slammer’s IP address and octet generation.  In Section 4.3 the Matlab 
worm models are presented for comparison to the original Slammer worm and the routing 
worm models proposed by Zou.  The comparison of worm speeds possible on computing 
systems of today versus those available in 2003 is provided in Section 4.4.  Section 4.5 
examines the infection rate of the original Slammer worm versus the SSE routing worm. 
4.1 Slammer Packet Generation  
The test run to identify a mean packet generation time by an infected system 
yielded interesting results.  Twenty separate collections of packets generated by the 
original Slammer worm code are collected and analyzed.  As shown in Table 12, the 
mean time between packet generation is 69.46 µsec with the laptop operating on A/C 
power.  This generation time is extremely stable, as seen by the small standard deviation 
and confidence intervals.  This equates to 14,398 packets per second (pps), which falls 
into the upper half of the range observed during the Slammer worm’s original release of 
an average 4,000 and maximum 26,000 scans per second per worm-infected machine 
[MPS03].   
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Table 12. Slammer Packet Per Second on A/C Power 
 
Average Inter-Arrival 
Time of Infection 
Packets
Standard 
Deviation
Upper 
Confidence 
Interval @95%
Lower 
Confidence 
Interval @ 95%
Packets Per 
Second or 
Scans Per 
Second
69.46 µsec 1.49 µsec 70.11 µsec 68.8 µsec 14398 pps  
The testing of Slammer’s packet per second capability reveals an increase in the 
time to generate packets when the system is operating on battery power.  A short test and 
analysis of this anomaly is performed to calculate the packets per second of Slammer on 
battery power.  As shown in Table 13, the infected system generates less than half of the 
amount of packets on battery power as it does on A/C power.  The mean time between 
packet generation is 152.28 µsec with the laptop operating on battery power.  The 
standard deviation and confidence intervals are only slightly larger than those observed 
while operating on A/C showing that the system is still fairly stable in the packet per 
second generation while operating on battery power.  This generation rate equates 6,567 
pps on battery power.  Although this is amount is less than half of the observed amount 
when operating on A/C power, Slammer is still generating over the average 4,000 and 
below the maximum 26,000 scans per second per worm-infected machine observed on 
the Internet [MPS03].   
Table 13. Slammer Packet Per Second on Battery Power 
 
Average Inter-Arrival 
Time of Infection 
Packets
Standard 
Deviation
Upper 
Confidence 
Interval @95%
Lower 
Confidence 
Interval @ 95%
Packets Per 
Second or 
Scans Per 
Second
152.28 µsec 6.01 µsec 155.55 µsec 149.02 µsec 6,567 pps  
This data confirms that the Slammer code being utilized is operating within the 
previously observed characteristics and validates the use of the A/C power packets per 
second for use in calculating the time it will take to infect a group of systems of similar 
53 
construction.  The validation of the Matlab model infection rates will initially be 
validated using 4,000 scans per second per worm [ZTG05], [WMS05], [MPW03].  
Moore’s Law has been refined and changed over the years.  Adjustments had to 
be made due to observations where Moore’s Law fell short by 38% during a 1970’s 
estimate and was over by 27% in 1975 of transistor capabilities.  The original version of 
the law developed in 1965, was that the doubling would occur every 12 months.  Later, 
there was some consideration given to increase the time span to 24 months.  This 
refinement led to the currently quoted estimation of 18 months.   
Due to this ever-changing growth rate, this 18-month rule has been refined further 
to try and match the observed growth curves.  Dave Epstein of the Microprocessor 
Report suggested a solution to the variation in Moore’s Law called “Epstein’s 
amendment.”  Epstein’s amendment modifies the growth calculations of Moore’s Law by 
adding an additional six months to the doubling rate on an every ten years interval.  
Where in the 1970s the growth rate was every twelve months, by 1980 the doubling rate 
needed to be increased to every 18 months.  Finally, by Epstein’s amendment, the growth 
rate in 2000 was projected to double every 30 months [Hal06]. 
In consideration of Moore’s Law and Epstein’s modification, the operational 
characteristics of systems currently connected to the Internet should approach the average 
Slammer packet per second generation of 3.2 times that originally observed in January of 
2003.  Thus, a network of computers in January 2007 should produce an average of 
12,800 pps when infected by Slammer.  The observed packet per second rate for a 
Slammer infected system during this research is 14,398 pps.  The observed packet per 
second generation is 12.48% greater than that of the Moore’s Law with the Epstein 
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modification estimate.  However, the estimated 2007 upper limit of scan per second is 
calculated at 83,200 using Moore’s Law with the Epstein amendment.   This makes the 
14,398 pps observed during this research fall within the estimated range from the average 
of 12,800 to a maximum of 83,200 for a computing system of today.  Thus, for final 
speed analysis of a computing system in 2007 the average observed results for Slammer 
packet generation on an A/C power source of 14,398 pps is used.   
4.2 Slammer Randomness  
The true randomness of the original Slammer worm’s pseudo random number 
generator has previously been studied by Moore [MPS03].  In that analysis they observed 
a small flaw that limited the ability of the original Slammer worm to generate random 
numbers, the corrections of which are discussed in more detail in Appendix B [MPS03].  
However, this flaw did not prevent Slammer from essentially taking over the Internet 
during its run [HyE03].  In these next two subsections the analysis of Slammer’s 
capability to uniformly generate random IP Addresses across the IP address range under 
test is presented.  First, Slammer’s ability to generate a uniform distribution of IP’s across 
the entire address span under test is considered.  Then Slammer’s ability to generate a 
uniform random distribution across the individual last three IP address octets is 
examined.   
4.2.1 Slammer IP Address Randomness 
The analysis provided here shows that despite its flaws, the original Slammer 
worm generated IP addresses are well distributed throughout the address space.  
However, as a whole there is a pattern in the form that the addresses are generated.  This 
could be indicative of the flaw noted by Moore [MPS03] [MPW03].   
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The lag plot in Figure 12 of the IP addresses generated by the Slammer worm is a 
typical example of 100,000 data points obtained during testing.  This lag plot of the 
combined octets generated by Slammer shows a pattern in the IP address generation.  The 
addresses that are generated seem to develop a repeating diamond pattern formed by two 
faintly intersecting lines.  From this lag plot it is clear that there is an observable pattern 
to the generation of random numbers by Slammer.  Despite this anomaly, the worm 
provides a fairly uniform distribution for the statistical coverage of the entire range of IP 
addresses being considered in this experiment. 
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Figure 12. Lag Plot of Slammer-Generated IP Addresses 
The regression equation of the Slammer IP addresses gathered from the infection 
packets, as shown in Table 14, shows that the p-value for the comparison to the 
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statistically generated IP address line is zero.  This means there is a high correlation 
between the statistical and Slammer-generated IP addresses.  Further, the R-squared 
values, which represent the closeness of fit to a linear line, are both 100% indicating that 
the Slammer-generated packets match the statistical line 
Table 14. Slammer IP Address Generation Regression Analysis 
 
Source DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 1.53721E+18 1.53721E+18 4.06328E+11 0.000
Error 65533 2.47923E+11 3.78318E+06
Total 65534 1.53721E+18
The regression equation is
Slammer Generated = -197.4 + 1.00 Statistically Generated
Analysis of Variance
S = 1945.04 R-Sq = 100% R-Sq(adj) = 100%
 
 
The residual plots, shown in Figure 13, further demonstrate the even distribution 
of the Slammer-generated IP addresses.  Although there is a large variation in the 
calculated value of residuals, this can be explained by the size of the address space 
compared to the number of samples.  Because the address space under consideration is 
4.3 billion possible addresses and the number of samples used in analysis limited by 
software restrictions and memory limits, the residual analysis is based on 0.0015 percent 
of the possible addresses available.   This numerical limitation is causing the larger 
variation in residuals shown.  However, both visually and mathematically, the plots show 
that the differences between the IP addresses generated by Slammer are uniform across 
the range of the address space.  The normal probability plot illustrates that the generated 
packets match the statistical line with only a small deviation at the tails of less than one 
percent.  Both the fitted value and observation order of the residuals show that there is an 
even distribution of differences across the IP address range.  Finally, the histogram of the 
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residuals shows a well centered distribution with tails that fall away at a smooth rate.  
The histogram strongly indicates the Slammer-generated IP addresses and the statistically 
generated IP addresses are the same. 
The fitted line plot in Figure 14 demonstrates both visually and mathematically 
that the IP addresses generated by Slammer and the statistical model are identical.  As 
shown previously in the analysis of the residuals, this fitted line plot analysis calculates 
the R-squared values to be a 100% match. 
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Figure 13. Residual Plots of Slammer IP Address Generation 
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Figure 14. Fitted Line Plot of Slammer versus Statistical Model 
Thus, despite the Slammer-generated IP address pattern observed in Figure 12, 
the IP addresses generated are shown to be uniformly distributed across the IP range 
being considered.  This uniform distribution ensures the experiment will accurately 
represent the simulation of a randomly scanning worm across the IP address space. 
4.2.2 Slammer Octet Randomness 
In this subsection each individual octet generated by Slammer is examined to 
determine the uniformity of distribution throughout the octet range.  This uniform 
distribution demonstrates a statistical coverage, in that the entire range is of addresses is 
chosen with equal probability, over the entire range of octets being considered in this 
experiment.  The detail provided in this section further validates the ability of a Slammer-
based worm to randomly generate any octet value for a given IP range.  Each octet is 
individually examined to provide fine granularity for emphasis on the uniform 
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distribution within the set of randomly generated octets.  Each individual lag plot is a 
typical example of a collection of 2,560 data points.  This provides the clearest visual 
indication of whether a trend in the data is present.  However, the regression equations 
and residual plots are attained through the use of the same typical 65,534 data point 
captures.   
4.2.2.1 Slammer Second Octet Randomness 
Shown  in Figure 15, the lag plot of the second octet demonstrates some of the 
previously observed anomalies that were found during the evaluation of the combined 
octet generation lag plot.  Here the lines are harder to discern, but the lines are still 
visually observable illustrating that there is some pattern to the generation of the octets.  
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Figure 15. Lag Plot of Slammer-Generated Second Octet 
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However, once again the regression equation of the Slammer generation of the 
second octet, as shown in Table 15, shows a value of zero for the p-value for the 
comparison to the statistically generated octet series.  This means there is a high 
correlation between the statistical and Slammer-generated random octet series.  Further, 
the R-squared values, which represent the closeness of fit to a linear line, are both 100% 
indicating that the Slammer-generated packets match the statistical line. 
Table 15. Slammer-Generated Second Octet Regression Analysis 
 
Source DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 357748656 357748656 3.95816E+09 0.000
Error 65533 5923 0
Total 65534 357754579
The regression equation is
Slammer Generated = -0.5422 + 0.9998 Statistically Generated
Analysis of Variance
S = 0.300637 R-Sq = 100% R-Sq(adj) = 100%
 
The residual plots, shown in Figure 16, further demonstrate the even distribution 
of the Slammer-generated IP addresses.  The 4-way plot shows that the differences 
between the octets generated by Slammer and the statistical model are uniform across the 
range of the address space.  The normal probability plot illustrates that the generated 
packets match the statistical line with some small deviation at the tails of less than five 
percent.  Both the fitted value and observation order of the residuals show that there is an 
even distribution of differences across the octet range, but visually there appears to be 
some possible sinusoidal pattern to the octets generated.  This sinusoidal modulation is 
small with a +/- 0.25 difference in the residuals.  The histogram of the residuals illustrates 
a visually unusual pattern with the distribution of the histogram being normally 
distributed with a flattened top.  This flattened top is not due to graphical clipping, but 
indicates that the differences in the residuals are evenly spread across the octet address 
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span.  Despite these unusual visual patterns, the statistical analysis of the regression 
equation denotes the data is statistically uniformly distributed across the address space. 
In the fitted line plot in Figure 17, it is shown that both visually and 
mathematically that the second octet generated by Slammer and the statistical model are 
identical.  As shown previously in the analysis of the residual equation and plots, the 
fitted line plot analysis shows the R-squared values to be a 100% match. 
10-1
99.9999
99.99
99
90
50
10
1
0.01
0.0001
Residual
P
er
ce
nt
240180120600
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
Fitted Value
R
es
id
ua
l
0.510.340.170.00-0.17-0.34-0.51
600
450
300
150
0
Residual
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
65
00
0
60
00
0
55
00
0
50
00
0
45
00
0
40
00
0
35
00
0
30
00
0
25
00
0
20
00
0
15
00
0
10
00
0
50
001
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
Observation Order
R
es
id
ua
l
Normal Probability Plot Versus Fits
Histogram Versus Order
Residual Plots for Slammer Generated Second Octet
 
Figure 16. Residual Plot for Slammer-Generated Second Octet 
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Figure 17. Fitted Line Plot for Slammer-Generated Second Octet 
4.2.2.2 Slammer Third and Fourth Octet Randomness 
The analysis for the third and fourth octets generated by Slammer reveals results 
that are almost identical.  Unlike the combined octet and second octet lag plots, the lag 
plots for the third and fourth octets shown in Figures 18 and 19 do not exhibit any 
discernable address generation pattern.  This provides further evidence that the pattern 
observed in the combined and second octet lag plot analyses are related and not 
necessarily pervasive throughout the original Slammer worm random address generation 
code.  This also indicates that the diamond pattern observed is related to the errors 
denoted in the Slammer worm analysis performed by Moore [MPS03].  Further detailed 
analysis to pinpoint this anomaly in the random number generation algorithm anomaly is 
not part of this research; however this may need to be investigated prior to extending the 
experiment presented here. 
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Another indication in the similarity between the third and fourth octets is the 
extremely small difference in their regression equations as shown in Tables 16 and 17.  
Due to this similarity, their analysis is combined for brevity.  The regression equations 
for the Slammer generation of these last two octets each have a zero for their p-value.  
This proves there is a high correlation between the statistical and Slammer-generated 
random octets.  The R-squared values for each of the last two octets equal 100%.  This 
analysis shows, once again, that the random octets generated by Slammer match the 
statistical line. 
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Figure 18. Lag Plot of Slammer-Generated Third Octet 
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Figure 19. Lag Plot of Slammer-Generated Fourth Octet 
Table 16. Slammer-Generated Third Octet Regression Analysis 
 
Source DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 3576561334 3576561334 3.44431E+09 0.000
Error 65533 6805 0
Total 65534 357662938
The regression equation is
Slammer Generated = -0.5076 + 0.9996 Statistically Generated
Analysis of Variance
S = 0.322242 R-Sq = 100% R-Sq(adj) = 100%
 
Table 17. Slammer-Generated Fourth Octet Regression Analysis 
 
Source DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 357164896 357164896 3.23815E+09 0.000
Error 65533 7228 0
Total 65534 357172124
The regression equation is
Slammer Generated = -0.517399 + 0.999 Statistically Generated
Analysis of Variance
S = 0.332113 R-Sq = 100% R-Sq(adj) = 100%
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The residual plots for the third and fourth octets, shown in Figures 20 and 21, 
continue to illustrate the even uniform distribution of Slammer infection packets.  The 4-
way residual plots display that the differences between the octets generated by Slammer 
and the statistical model are uniform across the range of the octet address space.  The 
normal probability plot illustrates that the generated packets match the statistical line with 
some small deviation at the tails approaching one percent.  Both the fitted value and 
observation order of the residuals show that there is an even distribution of differences 
across the octet range, but as observed in the analysis of the second octet, visually there 
appears to be some sinusoidal pattern to the octets generated.  This sinusoidal modulation 
is double the characteristics observed with the second octet with a  +/- 0.50 difference in 
the residuals.  However, unlike the histogram of the second octet, the histogram of the 
residuals for the third and fourth octets illustrate a more normally distributed pattern with 
only a small indication of a flattened top.   Although there appears to be a more 
pronounced sinusoidal pattern in the fitted and observed residuals, the statistical analysis 
of the regression data indicates that the data is statistically uniformly distributed. 
The fitted line plots shown in Figures 22 and 23 demonstrate both visually and 
mathematically that the last two octets generated by Slammer and the statistical model 
are virtually identical.  As shown previously in the analysis of the residual equation and 
plots, the fitted line plot analysis shows the R-squared values to be a 100% match. 
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Figure 20. Residual Plot for Slammer-Generated Third Octet 
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Figure 21. Residual Plot for Slammer-Generated Fourth Octet 
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Figure 22. Fitted Line Plot for Slammer-Generated Third Octet 
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Figure 23. Fitted Line Plot for Slammer-Generated Fourth Octet 
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From the data presented above, it is shown that the Slammer-generated third and 
fourth octets are uniformly distributed across the octet range.  The statistically generated 
model and the Slammer-generated packets match to a point of virtual identicalness.  This 
proves that within the total range of IP and octet addresses, Slammer generates a 
uniformly distributed set of random numbers for packet infection despite the pattern 
anomaly observed in the lag plots.  
4.3 Matlab Model Simulation of Slammer Routing Worm Operation 
This first section compares the results of the Matlab model-generated infection 
rates compared to the results presented by Zou to validate the Matlab model simulation.  
It also compares the estimated infection doubling rate during the original Slammer worm 
release versus the Matlab model infection doubling rate.  Finally, this section compares 
the Matlab model infection rate data from this experiment against the infection rate data 
generated in the Wei research.  
4.3.1 Validation of Matlab Model Infection Rate Simulation 
A short visual comparison of the infection rates of the Code Red and routing 
worms generated by Zou versus the Matlab model infection rates of those worms is 
provided.  A more detailed statistical comparison of the infection rates of original 
Slammer worm and the “/8” routing worm is compared against the infection rate 
generated by the Matlab model. 
4.3.1.1 Code Red versus Routing Worms 
Figure 24, the Code Red and Zou Code Red routing worm infection rates 
generated by the Zou research and the infection rates generated by the Matlab model.  
These infection rate models set the vulnerable systems at 360,000 and scan rate of 358 
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packets per minute for each worm simulated [ZTG05].  Due to the size of the simulation 
and the detailed analysis provided of the Slammer infection curves, these graphs are 
presented as a visual example of the accuracy of the Matlab model of the infection rate.  
The two charts show a similarity that indicates a strong correlation between the two 
simulation models.  These visual and numerical similarities based on the visual 
comparisons of the two graphs validate the Matlab model of infection rate.  This research 
was limited to visual comparisons due the unavailability of the raw research data 
generated by Zou.   
 
Figure 24. Zou Code Red versus Matlab Model Code Red Infection Rates 
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4.3.1.2 Original Slammer versus “/8” Routing Worm 
The infection rate data for the original Slammer worm is based on an average 
packet per second rate of 4,000 with 100,000 vulnerable systems [ZTG05].  The number 
of vulnerable systems, 100,000, appears to be an arbitrary number chosen by Zou for 
their research as it does not match the observed number of 74,856 systems infected 
[MPS03].  According to their research, the Slammer routing worm was based on 3,108 
pps with the same 100,000 vulnerable systems.  The infection rate characteristics found 
in their research are shown in Figure 25 [ZTG05]. 
 
Figure 25. Zou Slammer Worm versus Zou Slammer Routing Worm 
The infection rate generated by the Matlab model for comparison to the Zou 
research is run 20 times and a 95% confidence interval is provided.  Each of these 
infection rate curves uses the same factors of 100,000 vulnerable systems and an initial 
number of infected systems of 10 hosts used by Zou [ZTG05].  The Matlab model 
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generation of the Slammer routing worm infection curve is generated using the 3,108 pps 
to account for the increased size of the infection packet [ZTG05].  For the Matlab model 
generation of the original Slammer worm infection rate, the average of 4,000 pps 
observed during its original release is used.  The two infection rate curves are presented 
in Figures 26 and 27.  Additionally, a third Matlab model-generated infection rate curve 
for the Slammer routing worm is presented in Figure 28 with a 95% confidence interval 
over 20 runs with the packets per second set at 4,000.  The average infection rate curves 
from the data shown in Figures 26, 27 and 28 are combined into one graph presented in 
Figure 29 to show the speed differences between the Matlab models.   
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Figure 26. Matlab Model of Zou Slammer Routing Worm @ 3,108 pps 
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Figure 27. Matlab Model of Original Slammer Worm @ 4,000 pps 
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Figure 28. Matlab Model of Zou Slammer Routing Worm @ 4,000 pps 
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Figure 29. Matlab Model Composite of Slammer Infection Rates 
As shown in Figure 30, the infection rate curve of the Slammer routing worm 
presented by Zou and the Matlab model with the 3,108 pps do not match.  However, the 
Zou Slammer routing worm infection rate curve and the Matlab model with 4,000 pps 
show a strong similarity.  Based on this experiment, the simulation of the 3,108 pps 
Slammer routing worm has a slower infection rate than the curve generated by the Zou 
research.  Therefore, the simulations shown in the graph by Zou were either completed at 
the 4,000 pps, the description accompanying the graph is in error, or the infection rate 
data generated was in error. 
Using the validation from the Code Red and routing worm simulation graph 
comparison and the similarities shown in the original Slammer worm infect rates, the 
Matlab model-generated infection rate is validated.  Furthermore, the observation that the 
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Slammer routing worm infection rate presented by Zou was performed at the 4,000 pps 
level provides one additional point of validation of the Matlab model simulations while 
showing the graph in the Zou paper is in error. 
 
Figure 30. Matlab Model Slammer Worms versus Zou Slammer Worms 
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4.3.2 Matlab Model of Doubling Rate versus Observed Slammer Rate 
The next step in validation of the Matlab model is to compare the Matlab model 
simulation of the full Internet model with the actual numbers of Slammer vulnerable 
systems against the observed rate estimated during Slammer’s original release.  For 
comparison to the “real world” observations, this experiment uses the standard 74,856 
vulnerable systems with an average of 4,000 pps [MPW03].  Moore observed that a 
single worm had the potential to infect 7 (+/- 1) vulnerable systems per second 
[MPW03].  This translated to a global doubling rate of 8.5 (+/- 1) seconds which is used 
to generate a doubling rate curve with upper and lower bounds set at 9.5 and 7.5 seconds 
respectively [MPW03].  Within the Moore initial report, there is mention that this 
doubling rate was calculated for the first minute [MPW03].  Each of the doubling rate 
graphs presented below show the extension of that doubling rate to 216, or 65,536 systems 
infected, which is the largest doubling factor prior to exceeding the total number of 
vulnerable systems.  For clarity, a one minute reference line is provided on each of the 
infection doubling rate graphs to illustrate the cut-off of the one minute estimate by 
Moore [MPW03].   
The Matlab model-generated doubling rate is presented in Figure 31 using, as 
mentioned above, the original Slammer worm average of 4,000 packets per second as 
observed in 2003.  The confidence intervals are set at 95% for the Matlab model-
generated Slammer infection doubling rate.  The average doubling rate generated by the 
Matlab model at a 95% confidence interval is 9.348 (+/0.763) seconds for the first 
minute.  This is a difference of 0.848 (+/-0.237) seconds from the estimate of the original 
Slammer worm doubling rate.  The estimate of the original Slammer worm infection 
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doubling rate with the upper and lower bounds is presented in Figure 32 providing a 
curve representing the estimated infection rate.  Then finally for ease of comparison, the 
estimated doubling rate of the original Slammer worm and the Matlab model-generated 
doubling rate of the Slammer worm are plotted onto the same graph in Figure 33. 
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Figure 31. Matlab Model-Generated Doubling Rate 
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Figure 32. Slammer Doubling Rate 
As the combined data shows in Figure 33, the estimated doubling rate of the 
original Slammer and the Matlab model-generated doubling rate overlap for just over 140 
seconds.  This extension of the doubling rates beyond the one minute limitation shows 
that when continued to their infection limits, the two rates eventually separate and shows 
the original Slammer doubling rate completes the infection of the remaining systems 
faster than the Matlab model-generated doubling rate.  This indicates that the if the 
original Slammer doubling rate remained within the bounds set by the original estimate 
through the infection of the 65,536th system, the Slammer worm was faster than . 
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Figure 33. Matlab Model versus Observed Slammer Doubling Rate 
The closer view isolating the one minute limitation, shown in Figure 34, shows 
that there is some significant overlap of the two doubling rates.  The upper limit of the 
original Slammer doubling rate average is contained within the lower confidence interval 
of the Matlab model-generated doubling rate.  The containment of the observed Slammer 
doubling rate within the Matlab model until the 60-second point provides a further 
indication that the Matlab model is valid.  Further, the average of the original Slammer 
worm doubling rate was faster than the average that could be expected if the original 
Slammer worm was released more than once.   
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Figure 34. Matlab Model versus Slammer Doubling Rate Detailed 
Based on this experimental data, it is apparent that original Slammer worm 
operated faster than the expected average case determined by the validated Matlab model, 
to a point that it was always faster than the Matlab average and only contained inside the 
upper  (i.e., fastest) confidence interval at 95%.  Thus, the research shows that the 
original Slammer worm doubling rate, when originally released, operated faster than 
could be expected with multiple instances of its release. 
From the validation of this Matlab model by the estimated infection doubling rate 
and based on the previous validation of the Matlab model by the comparisons to the Zou 
research this model is validated using two methods.  Therefore, the full Internet infection 
rate of the Slammer Worm as calculated by the Matlab model simulations, and shown in 
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Figure 35, can be considered a valid model of how the Slammer worm would operate on 
a computing system in 2003. 
350300250200150100500
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
Time in Seconds
Sy
st
em
s 
In
fe
ct
ed
Lower Confidence Interval @ 95%
Average
Upper Confidence Interval @ 95%
Matlab Generated SlammerWorm 2003
 
Figure 35. Matlab Model-Generated Slammer Worm 2003 
This infection rate for Figure 35 is calculated using 74,856 vulnerable systems 
with the original Slammer worm average of 4,000 pps at a 95% confidence interval over 
20 runs.  The data shows that over 70,000 vulnerable systems would be infected between 
198.825 and 210.078 seconds with a 95% probability.  This is over 93% of the potential 
victims and it is well under the ten minute estimated during the original observation of 
the Slammer worm infection.  This estimate was calculated by using the number of scans 
observed at the three minute point of Slammer’s original release and extrapolating the 
expected time to scan 90% of the address space [MPW03].  Thus, this ten minute 
estimate was not an actual measurement of systems infected at the ten-minute point. 
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The conclusion that can be reached from this data is that while the Slammer 
infection doubling rates are not exactly the same, the first minute doubling rates do show 
significant overlap.  The doubling rates are both exponential and only differ in their 
estimation of the rate of infection.   
The differences between the estimated time to infect 90% of the systems and the 
Matlab model simulation in expected time for reaching the 90% level of infected systems 
is larger than expected.   However, there are several reasons that can be given as to why 
this variation in the two data sets occurred.  These include the admission by Moore in 
their research that not all of the data sets they analyzed were sufficiently precise over that 
initial short collection duration, which may have affected their analysis of how fast the 
doubling rate occurred [MPW03].  The difficulties of collecting accurate data during the 
original Slammer worm release were further exacerbated by an unexplained transient 
failure at the 2 minute and 40 second point after Slammer’s release [MPW03].  The 
ability to repeat the Matlab model simulation of the Slammer worm infection rate 
provides a database from which to draw a more comprehensive statistical model than 
does a single observation of the Slammer worm in the wild.  This means that the data 
estimates used by Moore to generate their results are but a single instance of how 
Slammer acted.  Slammer’s behavior would almost certainly have been different given 
other releases. 
4.3.3 Matlab Model versus Wei Slammer Infection Rate 
The Slammer experiments run by Wei, covered how the Slammer worm would 
react with differing traffic loads and network failures.  Their research included a simple 
baseline test with the 75,000 vulnerable hosts and 4,000 scans per second observed in 
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2003.  The baseline curve was presented with several other curves that showed the 
Slammer worm operation with varying traffic loads and network failures as shown in 
Figure 36 [WMS05].   
 
Figure 36. Wei Slammer Worm Simulation 
The Slammer infection rate generated by the Wei research closely matches the 
curve generated of the Slammer worm infection rate by the Matlab model in this research 
as shown in Figure 37.   The Wei experiment follows the Matlab model’s lower 
confidence interval through 50,000 systems infected.  The lower confidence interval of 
the Matlab model continues to closely match the Wei data until just past 65,000 systems 
infected where Wei’s data makes an uncharacteristic deviation from a smooth curve.  
Despite this top end deviation, the Wei data further supports the Matlab model of the 
Slammer worm infection rate as an accurate representation of how the Slammer worm 
behaves in the wild. 
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Figure 37. Matlab Model Slammer Worm versus Wei Slammer Worm 
4.4 Scanning Worms in a Computing Architecture of Today  
Zou’s research used an arbitrary number of Slammer vulnerable systems set at 
100,000 [ZTG05].  The actual number of potential victims is 74,856 [MPS03].  This 
section takes the Zou  experiment a few steps further by using the correct number of 
vulnerable systems and analyzes the operation of the scanning worms in a 2003 and 2007 
computing environment.  Thus the number of vulnerable systems is set at 74,856 and 
each of them are run with a 95% confidence interval and displayed separately.   
Note however, that although the speed increase of the network alone is considered 
here in this experiment, the increase in the number of vulnerable systems is not.  For ease 
of comparison, the vulnerable systems were left the same as any increase in the number 
of potential victim systems reduces the non-vulnerable systems by an equal number.  
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Thus, for every vulnerable system added above the 74,856 threshold the worm will 
spread faster.  For example, if the original Slammer worm using the 100,000 vulnerable 
systems as used by Zou  is compared to the infection rate using 74,856 vulnerable 
systems where both are set at the average 4,000 pps as observed during the original 
Slammer worm release [MPW03], the Zou  infection rate is faster as shown in Figure 38.  
Finally, because there is no basis of comparison in this research for the possible number 
of vulnerable systems as there is for the speed of the scanning packets generated by the 
Slammer code, the increase in vulnerable systems today is not be considered. 
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Figure 38. Zou Slammer Worm versus Matlab Model Slammer Worm 2003  
To provide a baseline for comparison, a Matlab model of the Slammer worm 
infection rate average with an upper and lower confidence interval at 95% as it would act 
in 2003 is provided in Figure 39.  This Matlab model uses 4.3 billion available addresses 
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in the scanning space, 74,856 vulnerable systems, and the average 4,000 pps for infection 
rate curve generation.  Hereafter, this worm is called the Slammer worm 2003.   
The Matlab model of the average infection rate curve with an upper and lower 
confidence interval at 95% of the Slammer worm as though the worm were released on a 
system today is provided in Figure 40.  Using the 4.3 billion available addresses, the 
74,856 vulnerable systems, and an average of 14,398 pps found in this research the 
Matlab model of the infection rate curve is generated.  Hereafter, this worm is referred to 
as the Slammer worm 2007. 
The Matlab model average of the Slammer routing worm as it would have acted 
in 2003 (Hereafter, the Slammer routing worm 2003) is presented in Figure 41 with an 
upper and lower confidence interval at 95%.  The Matlab model that generates this 
infection rate curve uses 1.95 billion available addresses, the number of vulnerable 
systems set at 74,856, and 3,108 pps as noted in the Zou research for the larger infection 
packet size [ZTG05]. 
In Figure 42, the Matlab model used to generate the average with an upper and 
lower confidence interval at 95% of the 2007 version of the Slammer routing worm uses 
a rate of 11,187 pps to reflect the increase for operation of the worm on a computing 
system of today.  The number of vulnerable systems is set at the same 74,856 and 1.95 
billion addresses available for scanning as the Slammer routing worm 2003.  Hereafter, 
this worm is referred to as the Slammer routing worm 2007. 
Finally, the average infection rate of the Slammer worm 2003, Slammer worm 
2007, Slammer routing worm 2003, and Slammer routing worm 2007 are plotted onto 
one graph for ease of speed comparison in Figure 43.  This graph shows that the infection 
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rates of worms on a system of today are faster than their 2003 counterparts.  Table 18 
shows the variable settings for all of the 2003 and 2007 worms. 
Table 18. Matlab Model Variables for 2003 versus 2007 Worm Comparison 
 
Number of IP 
addresses
Number of 
Vulnerable 
Systems 
Number of 
Iterations
Number 
of Trials
Initial Number 
of Infected 
Systems
Slammer Worm 2003 4,294,067,296 74,856 10,000,000 20 One
Slammer Worm 2007 4,294,067,296 74,856 10,000,000 20 One
Slammer Routing 
Worm 2003 1,946,156,941 74,856 500,000 20 One
Slammer Routing 
Worm 2007 1,946,156,941 74,856 500,000 20 One
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Figure 39. Matlab Model-Generated Slammer Worm 2003 
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Figure 40. Matlab Model-Generated Slammer Worm 2007 
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Figure 41. Matlab Model-Generated Slammer Routing Worm 2003 
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Figure 42. Matlab Model-Generated Slammer Routing Worm 2007 
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Figure 43. Matlab Model-Generated Slammer Worms and Slammer Routing Worms 
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This experimental data shows that a Slammer-based worm released onto the 
Internet of today is much faster than its 2003 counterparts.  As shown in Table 19, the 
increase in the infection of 90% of the potential victims for the two chronologically 
separated worms are almost identical at 3.599 fold increase.  This increase demonstrates 
the quicker infection rate due to the faster infection packet generation rate. 
Table 19. Matlab Model of 2003 versus 2007 Infection Rates 
 
Worm Name
Upper CI Average Lower CI
203.34 197.69 192.04
Upper CI Average Lower CI
56.49 54.92 53.35
Upper CI Average Lower CI
127.15 121.45 115.76
Upper CI Average Lower CI
35.32 33.74 32.16
Infection Rate in Seconds Infection 
Rate 
Increase
Slammer 
Routing Worm 
2007
Slammer 
Worm 2003
Slammer 
Routing Worm 
2003
Slammer 
Worm 2007 3.5995
3.5994
Infection 
Rate 
Increase
 
4.5 Single Slash Eight (SSE) Routing Worm 
This section covers the Single Slash Eight (SSE) routing worm and the modeling 
of its infection rate curve.  The final portion of this section provides a comparison of the 
SSE routing worm against the Slammer worm 2003, Slammer worm 2007, Slammer 
routing worm 2003, and Slammer routing worm 2007. 
4.5.1 SSE Routing Worm Creation 
 Taking the division of the Slammer routing worm one step further, the original 
Slammer worm code is modified to become an SSE routing worm which scans only one 
of the 116 “/8” IANA address spaces.  The SSE routing worm is creation details are 
available upon request 
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4.5.2 Matlab Model of the SSE Routing Worm  
The small changes to the original Slammer worm code discussed in Section 4.5.1 
increase the size of the SSE routing worm from 404 bytes to only 412 bytes.  Thus, a 
2003 version of the Slammer worm with an average of 4,000 pps is changed to a rate of 
3,922 pps for the 2003 version of the SSE routing worm.  The 2007 SSE routing worm 
packets per second is barely affected by the addition of only eight bytes and would slow 
the generation of infection packet on an infected system from 14,398 pps to 14,118 pps. 
An IP address space of 16,777,216 possible addresses is used to simulate the 
address space an SSE routing worm is required to scan with the single CIDR “/8.”  
Because the total address space is reduced, the total number of vulnerable systems is 
reduced by equally dividing the 74,856 by the 116 available address spaces.  This equates 
to 645 vulnerable systems in each SSE routing worm range.  Table 20 shows the 
variables used in the generation of the infection rate curves by the Matlab model for the 
2003 and 2007 SSE routing worms. 
Table 20. Matlab Model Variables for SSE Routing Worm 
 
Number of 
IP 
addresses
Number of 
Vulnerable 
Systems 
Number 
of 
Iterations
Number 
of Trials
Initial Number 
of Infected 
Systems
SSE 
Routing 
Worm
16,777,216 645 500,000 50 One
 
4.5.3 SSE Routing Worm Infection Rate Comparison 
Figures 45 and 46 show the 2003 and 2007 SSE routing worm infection rate 
curves with the accompanying 95% confidence intervals.  The 2003 SSE routing worm 
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infects over 90% of the vulnerable systems in under one minute.  However, the 2007 SSE 
routing worm infects over 90% of the vulnerable systems in under 17 seconds. 
The speed increase of these two worms over their 2003/2007 Slammer worm and 
2003/2007 Slammer routing worm counterparts is substantial as shown in Figure 47.  The 
SSE routing worm infect rates are aggregated across the entire population to provide a 
proportional comparison in Figure 47. 
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Figure 44. Matlab Model-Generated SSE Routing Worm 2003 
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Figure 45. Matlab Model-Generated SSE Routing Worm 2007 
 
Figure 46. Matlab Model SSE Routing Worms versus Slammer Worms 
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Table 21 contains the speeds at which these six worms infect over 90% of their 
vulnerable systems. 
Table 21. SSE Routing Worm Speed Comparison 
 
Worm Name
Upper CI Average Lower CI
203.34 197.69 192.04
Upper CI Average Lower CI
127.15 121.45 115.76
Upper CI Average Lower CI
61.83 59.92 58.01
Upper CI Average Lower CI
56.49 54.92 53.35
Upper CI Average Lower CI
35.32 33.74 32.16
Upper CI Average Lower CI
17.18 16.65 16.11
Infection Rate in Seconds
Slammer 
Routing Worm 
2007
SSE Routing 
Worm 2007
Slammer 
worm 2003
Slammer 
Routing Worm 
2003
SSE Routing 
Worm 2003
Slammer 
Worm 2007
 
Overall, the data collected shows that the SSE routing worm was 3.299 times 
faster than both the 2003 and 2007 Slammer worms.  Additionally, the SSE routing worm 
is also 2.027 faster than the 2003 and 2007 Slammer routing worms.  Finally, the increase 
in infection rate for the SSE routing worm from 2003 to 2007 is 3.6 times due to the 
increase in infection packet generation rate. 
4.6 Summary 
The first section of this chapter covered the network configuration for all of the 
experiments performed in this research and briefly covered the Slammer worm code used 
as a basis for this experiment.  The second section then delved into the results and 
analysis discovered through this research. 
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This chapter presents the results and analysis of the data collected from the 
experiment simulations of the worm infections.  Section 4.1 covers the collection and 
analysis of Slammer’s packet per second generation.  Section 4.2 examines the 
randomness of Slammer’s IP address and octet generation.  In Section 4.3, the Matlab 
worm models are presented for comparison to the original Slammer worm and the routing 
worm models proposed by Zou.  The comparison of worm speeds possible on computing 
systems of today versus those available in 2003 is provided in Section 4.4.  Section 4.5 
examines the infection rate of the original Slammer worm versus the SSE routing worm. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Restatement of the Problem and Conclusions 
The primary focus of this experiment was to show that the variety of scanning 
worms tested were faster than the original Slammer worm.  Further, the experiment set 
out to prove that the SSE routing worm was the fastest worm of its kind.  Lastly, this 
research examined whether the computing systems architecture of today would facilitate 
a much more aggressive worm than has been observed in previous outbreaks.  
This research found that despite an observable pattern of generation, IP addresses 
produced by Slammer are in a uniform distribution across the address space.  The 
detailed examination of the IP address generation data set proved again, despite the 
presence of an observable generation pattern, that the second IP octet generated by the 
Slammer code for this experiment was also uniformly distributed across the address 
space.  Finally, the third and fourth octets were shown to have no observable random 
number generation pattern, and they were uniformly distributed across their address 
space.   
After establishing randomness, the Matlab model simulations were compared to 
and validated by the previously created infection rate models used by Zou for the Code 
Red, BGP routing worm, “/8” routing worm, the original Slammer worm, and the 
Slammer routing worm [ZTG05].  The infection doubling rate observed by Moore during 
the original Slammer worm release and the research of the original Slammer worm 
infection rate performed by Wei provided further validation of the Matlab model and 
Slammer worm infection rate [MPW03] [WMS05].  During the validation of the Matlab 
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model simulations, one of the experiment graphs provided by Zou was either an error or 
notated incorrectly.   The Zou Slammer routing worm infection rate curve was 
significantly faster than what is expected for a worm operating with its characteristics. 
However, the analysis of the Slammer routing worm as hypothesized by Zou proved to be 
faster using the Matlab model simulations than the original Slammer worm.   
The extension of this research to include the current speed of the computing 
systems shows worms would be significantly faster on a computing network of today 
than they were in 2003.  The research showed that the worm infection rate for a worm in 
2003 was increased by a factor of 3.6 times for a worm operating on a computing system 
of 2007 due to the increased packet generation rate.  This research has given strong 
evidence that any scanning worm released on the architecture of today would cause even 
greater harm to the Internet infrastructure through its speed of infection and network 
congestion. 
Finally, the new SSE routing worm is faster than any of the worms evaluated.  
The SSE routing worm was more than three times faster than the original Slammer worm 
and more than two times faster than the Slammer routing worm proposed by Zou.  An 
SSE routing worm released today would have an infection rate 3.6 times faster than if it 
had been released in 2003 due to the faster infection packet generation. 
5.2 Contributions and Significance of Research 
This research has furthered the understanding of the operation characteristics of 
scanning worms on an IPv4 network and laid the groundwork for future experiments into 
live worm research.  The routing worms proposed by Zou have been validated and 
extended to an even faster version of routing worm illustrating that these worms pose a 
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great threat to the computing community and deserve further research.  The expansion of 
this research into the speed of the current computing systems architecture exposes the 
fact that Slammer will most likely not remain the fastest worm and that there is a large 
void in the analysis of worms on current architectures.  Through the use of the actual 
Slammer worm, a live host and a validated mathematical model, this experiment has 
furthered the research proposed by others. 
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
There is a large void in the research of live worms on a network.  Due to the 
problems incurred during the research of these worms several opportunities for future 
research based on this preliminary research are available.  The largest area for 
continuation of research is to solve the issue of the auto-generated multicast address for 
UDP packets generated by Slammer, which afflicted every IP address generated.  Also, 
the problem of modifying the Slammer assembly code to accept the changes required to 
set the IP address field with the “hit list” values needs to be investigated.  These two 
problems may be related.  Once these problems are solved many more research avenues 
open up.     
The observation and testing of live worms on a network is an area that could 
validate many mathematical models currently in use by researchers worldwide.  With the 
speed of computing systems continually increasing, these models need current data 
harvested from a live network to validate and ensure they incorporate the capabilities of 
today’s systems.  As shown in this experiment, the current architecture is significantly 
faster than what was in place in 2003, which is the timeframe of when the majority of the 
worm research is based. 
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Finally, modifying the worms to operate on an IPv6 network and analyzing their 
ability to propagate in that environment would be groundbreaking research.  
Incorporating the increase in speed of computing systems, the capabilities of the routing 
worms examined in this research and calculating the increase of vulnerable systems for a 
given software vulnerability would provide a significant leap forward in the research of 
self-propagating worms on an IPv6 network.  While other researchers have made claims 
that the conversion to IPv6 would all but eliminate the capability of a scanning worm to 
propagate, the proof on an existing system with live worms and the characteristics of the 
computing systems of today has yet to be completed.   
5.4 Summary 
This research has expanded the knowledge of the operation of scanning worms on 
an IPv4 network and proved that the Slammer routing worm and SSE routing worm is 
faster than any previously observed worm.  The groundwork laid by this research 
provides a solid foundation for future research into the area of live worms on a network. 
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Appendix A 
This appendix covers the hardware and software used during the research to 
complete the experiment. 
A.1 Experiment Hardware 
The computers used to facilitate the experiment are Dell Latitude Laptops and 
their specifications are shown in the Table 22.  The specifications for the switch 
connecting the laptops together are provided in Table 23. 
Table 22. Experiment Computer Specifications 
 
Victim Machine Attacking Machine
Dell Latitude D620 Dell Latitude D600
2 GB 533 MHz DDR2 RAM 512 MB 
Intel Core Duo T2400 1.83Ghz Intel Pentium M 1600 Mhz
80 GB 5400 RPM HD 30 GB 4200 RPM HD
Broadcom NetXtreme BCM5752 Gigabit 
Ethernet
Broadcom 570x Gigabit Integrated 
Controller  
 
Table 23. Port Switch Specifications 
 
Linksys SD205 10/100 Switch (5-port)
10/100 Mbps
Category 5 Ethernet
5 x RJ45 ports  
100 
A.2 Experiment Software 
The software used in this experiment is detailed in the Table 24 including the 
operating system version numbers. 
Table 24. Experiment Software Versions 
 
Microsoft Windows 2000 5.00.2195 Victim Machine
Microsoft SQL Server 8.00194 Victim Machine
Wireshark Network Analyzer 00.99.3 Both Machines
Netcat 1.11 Attacking Machine
Matlab 7.3.0 (R2006b) Attacking Machine
Frhed 1.1.0 Attacking Machine  
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Appendix B 
This appendix covers in detail the code and operation of Slammer.  The information 
contained in this section is available upon request.  
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Appendix C 
This appendix describes the generation of the infection rate simulation by the 
Matlab model used in this research.  
C.1 Matlab Model Infection Rate Simulation Code 
The code below was used to generate all of the worm infect curves for 
comparison to the available data and previously described mathematical models.  As 
defined in the comments of the code “N” is set to be the total number of available address 
for the scale of the test.  The number of vulnerable systems was denoted by “n.”  The 
maximum number of iterations, which is converted to seconds for final analysis, is 
represented by “M.”  The value for “M” in these experiments is arbitrary as this 
experiment considers the entire vulnerable system space and it is set to a number beyond 
the expected infect iteration found by preliminary testing.  Further, the code is set to 
“break” out of the current trial when the number of potential victims reaches zero.  Note 
that there is an equal chance of any number being generated by the pseudo random 
number generator (PRNG), thus the number of vulnerable systems is reduced by one 
without regard to which number in the vulnerable range was guessed by the PRNG.  “K” 
represents the number of trials.  The number of trials is an arbitrary value set high enough 
to allow for the complete infection of all vulnerable systems.  The Matlab code was set to 
exit the current trial after the last vulnerable system was infected to decrease the time 
between trails.  The initial number of infected systems is represented by “I” and is 
highlighted in the code provided below.  Table 39 shows the values used for the 
variations of the Matlab simulations. 
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Table 25. Matlab Model Experiment Variable Values 
 
N - # of IP 
addresses
n - # of 
Vulnerable 
Systems 
M - # of 
Iterations
K - # 
of 
Trials
I - Initial # 
of Infected 
Systems
Code Red Worm 4,294,967,296 360,000 10,000,000 1 Ten
Zou Code Red "/8" 
Routing Worm 1,946,156,941 360,000 500,000 1 Ten
Zou Code Red BGP 
Worm 1,228,360,647 360,000 500,000 1 Ten
Zou Slammer Worm 4,294,967,296 100,000 10,000,000 20 Ten
Zou Slammer 
Routing Worm 1,946,156,941 100,000 500,000 20 Ten
Slammer Worm 
2003 4,294,967,296 74,856 10,000,000 20 One
Slammer Worm 
2007 4,294,967,296 74,856 10,000,000 20 One
Slammer Routing 
Worm 2003 1,946,156,941 74,856 500,000 20 One
Slammer Routing 
Worm 2007 1,946,156,941 74,856 500,000 20 One
SSE Routing Worm 
2003 16,777,216 645 500,000 50 One
SSE Routing Worm 
2007 16,777,216 645 500,000 50 One
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*********************************************************************** 
% N is the total # of IP adresses 
% n is the total # of potential victims 
% M is the maximum # of iterations 
% K is the number of trials 
% I (highlighted) is the initial number of infected systems – this value needs to manually changed in the  
%  code 
function [TargetInfectTime,VictimInfectTime] = IPsim(N,n,M,K) %Designates the function for Matlab 
TargetInfectTime=M*ones(1,K);  %Creates M arrays of ones the size of K for storage of TargetInfectTime 
infected=zeros(1,K);  %Creates an array of zeros the size of K for storage of infected 
VictimInfectTime=zeros(K,n); % Creates an array of zeros K by n for storage of VictimInfectTime 
for j=1:K     
    n1=n; % Sets the upper limit of the vulnerable systems range equal to total number of potential victims 
        for i=1:M  
 IP = ceil(N*rand(1,(infected(j)+ I ))); % generates a random number in the range of N for each  
         %infected system and turns it into an integer 
if sum(IP<=(n1+1))>=1 %if IP address is less than or equal to the upper value of the  
            % vulnerable systems enter loop 
VictimInfectTime(j,infected(j)+1:infected(j)+sum(IP<=(n1+1))) = 
i*ones(1,sum(IP<=(n1+1))); %Sets the time of infection for each IP address  
       %within the vulnerable system range, this check is  
       %performed multiple times if more than one is hit 
             infected(j)=infected(j)+sum(IP<=(n1+1)); %Increases the number of infected systems 
             n1=n1-sum(IP<=(n1+1)); %Reduces the number of vulnerable systems by number hit 
            end 
if n1 == 0 %When number of Vulnerable systems reaches zero break 
      break  
     end 
   end   
    results=fopen('results.txt','w');   % Opens “results.txt” for writing of data 
    fprintf(results,'Number of Machines Infected %10.0f\n',infected); % Prints # Infected to file 
    fprintf(results,'Victim Infected %10.0f\n', VictimInfectTime'); % Prints Infect Time to file 
    fclose(results) % Closes “results.txt”  
end     
end 
*********************************************************************** 
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Appendix D 
This appendix contains a detailed breakout of a typical UDP header from a 
Slammer packet.  This information is available upon request. 
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Appendix E 
This appendix contains the detailed information for the creation of the SSE 
routing worm as previously discussed in Section 4.5.  The information in this appendix is 
available upon request.  
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